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ABSTRACT
American upheaval over the Chinese technologically advanced strategic threat permeates
throughout the government and political culture. The response to this fear is a somewhat nascent
reactive U.S. policy toward China as it relates to strategic weapon systems. The U.S. currently is
responding by attempting to revitalize an aging nuclear architecture, and re-prioritize strategic
weapons in U.S. defense spending. However, U.S. policy must move beyond justifying nuclear
weapons and requesting increased funding. What is necessary for this balance beyond an arms
race is the intellectual prescription for the calculated employment or fielding of those arms.
Ultimately, this paper suggests the U.S. develop a Chinese facing strategic weapons policy
consisting of a phased approach of temporal periods with associated polices, technological
pursuits, and arms control implications - similar to those posited in the early stages of the Cold
War. This paper assessed formal U.S. policy documents, de-classified documents, and federal
intelligence reports and testimonies to understand more completely nuclear/strategic weapon
force postures. The research canvassed publications from well-known Western think tanks,
diplomats, and officials; as well as comparable non-Western, primarily Asian sources for a more
complete analysis of culture, economy, and policy. The paper concludes that Chinese nuclear
force posture and economic dynamics provide a window for the United States to prepare its own
strategic forces and policy to better address the growing threat. This type of complex strategic
analysis proved critical to responsive nuclear force postures in the Cold War. An assessment of
Chinese strategic culture provided insight into how to produce an effective and dynamic U.S.
nuclear policy. Lastly, a sample time-bound force development road map depicts the utility and
applicability of such a model, while making some key recommendations for future policy.
KEYWORDS: Chinese nuclear posture, U.S. nuclear policy, nuclear strategy, Chinese strategic
culture, strategic periods, Cold War and current policy, Chinese economic challenges, U.S.China rivalry, arms race, great power competition.
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INTRODUCTION

A somewhat nascent reactive fear drives the current U.S. policy toward China as it relates
to strategic weapon systems. The Cold War concepts of strategic balance of terror, nuclear
parity, and mutually assured catastrophic responses are familiar to most American decisionmakers. However, far from a well-reasoned and detailed strategy, our nuclear and strategic
weapons posture rises on the laurels of a crude fear of the other. This fear is crude primarily
because it is an initial reaction to a perceived or impending technological imbalance. The current
National Security Strategy (NSS) states “China … challenge[s] American power, influence, and
interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity. They are determined to make
economies less free and less fair, to grow their militar[y] …and expand their influence.”1 This
strategy reads as an initial call to action. The strategy targets primary adversaries, and identifies
points of contention: “China [is] developing advanced weapons and capabilities that could
threaten our critical infrastructure and our command and control architecture… Its nuclear
arsenal is growing and diversifying.”2 This type of language ushered in the return of great power
competition as the central threat to U.S. interests. Here, the NSS characterizes the threat as
advanced strategic weapon systems designed to hamper American security.
The acceptance of the great Chinese threat asserted by the NSS penetrates all levels of
American governance and political commentary and theory. A publication from the National
Defense University Press (NDU) provides in depth analysis of the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) reform and modernization. The NDU document also spotlights the American fear of

1.
2.

United States White House. National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington D.C.:
GPO, 2017), 2, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf
(accessed January 2019).
Ibid, 8, 25.
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growing Chinese strategic might. The publication affirms, “Reforms to the broader Chinese
armed forces… could permit… Beijing a strong hand in gray zone operations against other
claimants… Moreover, a Chinese military [with] advanced and innovative weapons would be an
even more formidable strategic competitor over the long term.”3 Much of the rhetoric consists of
conditional projections, but the message is clear. Act now to avoid future systemic rebalancing or
even peril. In an annual Department of Defense (DoD) report to Congress on the disposition of
Chinese military strength, the DoD asserts that Chinese pursuits seek to increase military
prowess to “expand the country’s international influence”.4 Here the DoD embraces and
confirms the White House image of America under siege. Prominent members of academia
further the concerns of the U.S. executive branch. University of California Berkley professor and
Chinese expert, Lowell Dittmer, suggests that the U.S. fears a change in the status quo of its
dominant global authority. This fear is predicated on China’s economy, even in conservative
estimates, continuing down an unstoppable trajectory and soon surpassing that of the United
States across multiple metrics; particularly as it relates to gross domestic product (GDP).5
Upheaval over the Chinese technologically advanced strategic threat permeates beyond the
executive branch and academia, and receives bipartisan support from the United States Congress.
Republican Representative Michael Waltz feared that a continuing resolution would “put U.S.
defense behind bad actors like … China” and called for joint political pressure on “China’s

3.
4.
5.
6.

Arthur Ding, et al, “Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms” (Edited by Phillip
Saunders, National Defense University Press, 2019), 723.
ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/Chairman-Xi/Chairman-Xi.pdf.
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, Annual Report to Congress
(Washington D.C.: United States Department of Defense, 2019), i, (accessed January 2019).
Lowell Dittmer, China's Asia: Triangular Dynamics since the Cold War (London: Rowman et Littlefield,
2018), 263, 273.
Michael Waltz, and Jim Inhofe, “Morning News of Note” (Edited by Department of Defense Public Affairs
Office, January 16, 2019); Michael Waltz. “Morning News of Note” (Edited by Department of Defense Public
Affairs Office, November 6, 2019).
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authoritarian regime”.6 Republican Senator Jim Inhofe describes the critical need to combat
China in theaters of interest across the world.7 On two occasions, Democratic Senator Chuck
Schumer spoke against Chinese commercial information technology companies and their
nefarious strategic threat as tools employed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).8
Democratic Representative Adam Schiff spoke vehemently against the CCP’s involvement in
protests in Hong Kong characterized by Western media as democratic.9 The Chinese strategic
threat remains one of the few majoritarian matters that carries vocal bi-partisan support in the
U.S. legislature. The growing Chinese strategic threat described in the most recent NSS, shapes
and reflects an American consensus.
Evidently, strategic competition characterizes the U.S. and Chinese relationship. As
suggested above, America’s political leadership most frequently characterizes this relationship as
a challenge to security. In fact, describing various components of this Asian security risk
consumes most U.S. defense literature and commentary. This risk builds towards a rudimentary
call to action by pointing out a relative U.S. vulnerability, and the negative impact it likely poses
for U.S. deterrence. Compared to growing Chinese strategic weapon capabilities many experts
describe the growing U.S. strategic weapon deficiency. The aging nuclear arsenal becomes the
focal point of this deficiency due to the centrality of nuclear weapons in U.S. deterrence. The
NSS justifies nuclear weapons as the most discussed and familiar component of strategic
weaponry,
Nuclear weapons have served a vital purpose in America’s National Security
Strategy for the past 70 years. They are the foundation of our strategy to preserve
7.
8.
9.

Ibid
Charles Schumer, “Morning News of Note” (Edited by Department of Defense Public Affairs Office, November
24, 2019); Charles Schumer, “Morning News of Note” (Edited by Department of Defense Public Affairs Office,
December 30, 2019).
Adam Schiff, “Morning News of Note” (Edited by Department of Defense Public Affairs Office, November 18,
2019).
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peace and stability by deterring aggression against the United States, our allies,
and our partners. While nuclear deterrence strategies cannot prevent all conflict,
they are essential to prevent nuclear attack, non-nuclear strategic attacks, and
large-scale conventional aggression.10
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) goes on to claim that deterring nuclear attack and
maintaining an arsenal to accomplish this was and is the highest priority for the DoD.11 With
strategic weapon systems and nuclear weapons in particular so crucial to U.S. defense, the
degradation of this capability is a major cause for concern. The concern only worsens in light of
the consensus regarding the Chinese threat.
The United States reduced the role of nuclear weapons and their associated support
structure following the Cold War.12 Now, most of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is 40 years old with
research and engineering replacement projects only in their early stages.13 The disparity between
an American decaying force structure and the rapidly modernizing force of the soon to be largest
global economy should menace U.S. policy makers. While the U.S. nuclear budget experienced
25 years of relative neglect regarding modernization, the Chinese developmental strategic
weapons budget remained unconstrained.14 The natural response to this realization is a shock to
the decaying nuclear infrastructure. The U.S. cannot continue to dominate great power strategy
with a loss in pre-eminence of strategic weaponry.
The United States must, (largely has), prioritize nuclear weapons and new delivery
mechanisms as top budget appropriations items. The constructs of federally funded research
development centers and defense and commercial industry must turn an ear toward the call for
10. United States White House, NSS, 30.
11. United States Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2018) 7,
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINALREPORT.PDF (accessed January 2019).
12. United States White House, NSS, 30-31.
13. United States Department of Defense, NPR, 8.
14. Thérèse Delpech, Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of
Strategic Piracy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012), 159.
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pre-eminence. The DoD asserted just this to Congress, “The United States will adapt its forces,
posture, investments, and operational concepts to ensure it retains the ability to defend the
homeland, [and] deter aggression.15 Everything then seems to be falling into place. Even if the
U.S. security infrastructure was slow to respond to the growing Chinese threat amidst the Global
War on Terror, it has properly adjusted course. The U.S. identified a threat and is adequately
responding. This assumption is incorrect due to the incomplete development of the U.S.
response.
The NSS defines the issue with regard to strategic competition but it does not offer a
specific strategy beyond technological development to maintain basic deterrent functions. Even
the NPR reads mostly as a justification for why the U.S. needs nuclear weapons and new
strategic weapon systems. Perhaps it should reflect an actual strategy for planned employment or
planned development vis-a-vis our adversaries’ projected strengths. Without a sophisticated,
tailored, and time bound strategy we risk missing the opportunity to approach these problems
from a position of superiority. Currently, we hold the technological capability and force
structure advantage over China. During the Cold War, Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, and
many other prominent economists, physicists, and politicians sought to navigate the finer
elements of nuclear strategy. While some of their theories may have been misquoted, unrealistic,
or even flawed, the very nature of modeling and simulating such a complex existential issue
created a familiar nuclear discourse. This environment unified policy makers in a mindset of
preparation and strategic analysis. Prominent nuclear theorist and successor of Kahn and
Schelling from the Research and Development Corporation (RAND) Therese Delpech remarked,
We should not forget that in the nuclear arena, combat is first and foremost an
intellectual contest. The side that stops thinking is already losing, even if its
operational capabilities are vastly superior to those of its adversary. The United
15. Military and Security Developments, iv.
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States might be particularly vulnerable to this risk because of the known
American preference for a technical or engineering approach to solving even the
most daunting political problems.16
Delpech recognizes that while technological development is a key response, strategy is as much
a component of diplomacy as it is security. Nuclear war planning requires materiel and
psychology elements. To be deficient in either is to lose the competition. She understood that
both the technological and intellectual architecture have atrophied, and so far, the U.S. is only
attempting to match technological pursuits with competitors such as China. Intellectual deftness
can prevent the U.S. from needing to pursue every costly weapons development program. In the
new all domain strategic contest, somewhat abstract analysis can help to unify disparate
disciplines. Conversely, under-developed strategy can undermine deterrence with the addition of
too much uncertainty or the conveyance of incompetence. If deterrence fails, disorganization
could undermine effective strategic war fighting.
Our current knee jerk response to the projected Chinese threat is necessary. However,
U.S. policy must move beyond justifying nuclear weapons and requesting increased funding (the
disposition of the current policy documents). Consultant on the 2001 and 2018 NPRs, Dr. Keith
Payne furthers this argument: “In the absence of a close examination of the opponent and
context, it will be impossible to appreciate the thinking and motivations underlying a
challenger’s prospective behavior and how these might affect deterrence.”17 Payne, an advocate
for reinventing the nuclear triad, also believes that of equal import is an intellectual assessment
of the adversary. Prototyping an advanced system is great. However, understanding how and

16. Thérèse Delpech, Nuclear Deterrence, 17.
17. Keith B. Payne, The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction (Lexington: The University Press
of Kentucky, 2015), Ch. 8.
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when to implement in specific situation, against a particular adversary is better. This is a key
component of any post-Cold War deterrence strategy.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is one of the most vocal opponents of the CCP. Yet he
ended a vehement call to action against China with a desire for peace and joint prosperity.18 The
2017 NSS, 2018 NPR and the 2019 DoD Annual Report to Congress on Chinese military power
all share Pompeo’s desire for an eventual balance of power, and a stable coexistence with China.
What is necessary for this balance beyond an arms race is the intellectual prescription for the
calculated employment or fielding of those arms.
Ultimately, this paper suggests the U.S. develop a Chinese facing strategic weapons
policy consisting of a phased approach of periods - with associated polices, technological
pursuits, and arms control implications similar to those posited in the early stages of the Cold
War. In the second section of this paper, we will dissect the emerging strategic capabilities of
China, primarily nuclear, from a technological standpoint. This section will look at Chinese
nuclear/strategic force posture and determine if there exists a developmental or transitional
period for the United States to leverage. The next section will assess the associated comparative
economic challenges of such endeavors. It, too, will seek to substantiate that there currently
exists a window of opportunity to shape the strategic dialogue with China. The fourth section
will examine the efficacy of this type of strategizing in the Cold War nuclear deterrence model.
It will then seek to relate a Cold War policy state of affairs to that between China and the United
States. The fifth section will engage a thorough strategic culture assessment of China, and will
draw relevant conclusions for developing a tailored approach to strategic deterrence. The sixth
section will develop a sample strategy of periods with associated policy and implementation

18. Michael Pompeo “The China Challenge,” (Speech, Hudson Institute Award Gala, 2019).
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recommendations. The paper will close out with a few concluding remarks on the applicability of
this intellectual exercise.

8

CHINESE TECHNOLOGICAL AND MILITARY DISPOSITION AND
OPPORTUNITY

Chinese Nuclear and Strategic Force Posture
Almost 35 years of unprecedented growth have invigorated the military industrial
complex within China. China’s estimated military spending for 2018 was 190 billion dollars,
second to only the United States.19 This figure will likely increase as the Peoples Liberation
Army (PLA) develops more costly strategic assets and power projection weapon systems
commensurate with its political goals. Naturally, with the second best funded military on earth
and the largest economy by purchasing power parity (PPP), the United States is paying close
attention. More specifically, the U.S. is monitoring Chinese force structure, research and
development, and relative power. For the sake of this discussion, relative power most closely
describes strategic systems and deterrence capabilities therein. After all, to reference Cold War
era political theory, with the advent of nuclear weapons the purpose of militaries is no longer to
chiefly fight wars, but to prevent them.20
Beyond statistics, the U.S. government is interested in Chinese military development
because of China’s aspirations to become a powerful, prosperous, modernized society,
essentially equivalent to the United States by 2049.21 China seeks a powerful and preeminent
modernized military funded by their prosperous economy. The 2049 Centenary Goals that

19. Robert Ashley, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment,” Defense Intelligence Agency, 2018,
http://www.dia.mil/News/Speeches-and-Testimonies/Article-View/Article/1457815/statement-for-the-recordworldwide-threat-assessment/.
20. Bernard Brodie, Frederick Sherwood Dunn, and Arnold Wolfers, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and
World Order (New York: Harcourt, 1946), 76.
21. Lu Ding, “China’s ‘Two Centenary Goals’: Progress and Challenge,” East Asian Policy, Nanyang
Technological University , May 3, 2017, 80.
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Chinese President Xi Jinping prescribed to the CCP in 2013 provided a momentum to military
development and international relations. This momentum keenly focuses on strategic level power
projection. China’s most recent Military Strategy of 2015 states, “China will optimize its nuclear
force structure… and deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons
against China”.22 China’s nuclear rhetoric is prominent, declaratory, and central to its strategy.
Moreover, China is prioritizing strategic competition with the United States. General Ashley,
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), testified before the U.S. Congress that the
ongoing modernization of the PLA nuclear force is to ensure the viability of China’s strategic
deterrence in the face of perceived U.S. capabilities.23 The next great strategic competition is
upon the United States. Prior to positing strategy, characterizing the disposition of the Chinese
nuclear force and enabling forces will help to structure the discussion. The following will present
the general capabilities, posture, and trajectory of the Chinese nuclear force so that we can
discern what, if any, opportunity presents itself for future U.S. deterrence and dominance.
China possess approximately 290 nuclear warheads. Most of these are land-based, with
the remainder being sea-based.24 This number is somewhat misleading as there is a strong
emphasis in the PLA for dual-use systems - conventional and nuclear.25 Moreover, Chinese
unregulated quantities of fissile materials and current industrial complexes are poised as is, if
necessary, to produce over 100 nuclear weapons a year.26 The opacity of China’s military

22. “China Military Power, Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win,” Defense Intelligence Agency, January 2019,
37, www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_
FINAL _5MB_20190103.pdf.
23. Robert Ashley, “Statement for the Record,” DIA.
24. Caitlin Talmadge, “The U.S.-China Nuclear Relationship: Why Competition Is Likely To Intensify.,” Global
China, September 2019, 4, www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/FP_20190930_china_nuclear_
weapons_talmadge-2.pdf.
25. Yogesh Joshi and Frank O'Donnell, India and Nuclear Asia: Forces, Doctrine, and Dangers (Washington, DC:
Georgetown University Press., 2019), 90.
26. Thérèse Delpech, Nuclear Deterrence, 119.

10

operations particularly, and the classified nature of strategic assets in general, make the
approximate size and scalability of these statistics the key metric. While 290 may seem low for
assured counterforce targeting, it is more than adequate to raise ambiguity regarding assured
counter-value targeting or homeland defense against an invading force. The PLA Rocket Force
owns and operates road-mobile medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM), the DF-26;
intermediate range ballistic missiles (ICBM), the DF-26; with recently updated silo-based
equivalents, and the DF-31AG variant of the also employed DF-31A.27 The concentration on
mobile assets significantly improves the survivability and flexibility of China’s somewhat low
stockpile numbers. The mobile ICBMs are of particular value for the survivability of strategic
deterrence against the United States. Additionally, the PLA is developing and employing longrange cruise missiles capable of deployment from ground, sea, and air.28 Once employed, such
modular systems will afford China a cost effective measure capable of supporting a “nuclear
triad”. A nuclear triad is traditionally considered the optimal force structure for flexible and
survivable nuclear deterrence. This Cold War construct is not only of practical use for the
Chinese, it will serve as a symbol of peer competition and status once fully realized by the
Chinese (in keeping with their 2050 goals). The dual-use nature of the cruise missiles also adds
to deterrence due to the difficulty of ascertaining their employment. This type of ambiguity in the
nuclear domain increases the potential repercussions of bold and hasty decisions.
Also under development for the new generation of mobile missiles are multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) with penetration aids and countermeasures to
increase survivability.29 Additional strategic technologies in the research and engineering process

27. Caitlin Talmadge, “The U.S.-China Nuclear Relationship,” 4.
28. Robert Ashley, “Statement for the Record,” DIA.
29. “China Military Power,” DIA, 37.
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include maneuvering warheads, built-in ballistic missile jamming technology, thermal shielding,
and hypersonic glide vehicles.30 MIRVs, complex counter measures, and hypersonic vehicles all
add another dynamic to the nuclear triad that complicates an adversary’s deterrent and defense
potential. For instance, the United States currently only has developmental hypersonic vehicles
itself, no MIRVs, and no defensive answer to either.
In 2017 the PLA was assigned a nuclear mission with a developmental upgraded longrange H-6K bomber and J-20 stealth fighter as its backbone.31 The development of the air leg
rounds out the Chinese nuclear triad. Furthermore, the recall-ability of aircraft - along with their
time to target - are key for strategic signaling, flexible decision making, ally assurance, and other
sophisticated tenants of strategic deterrence. Long-range aircraft also extend the range of any
weapon system on-board. The aforementioned air-launched cruise missile, air launched ballistic
missile, as well as some stockpile gravity bombs would find a home here.
The PLA currently has six type 094 Jin class nuclear powered, ballistic missile capable
submarines. These submarines are capable of carrying 12 sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM)
each.32 While rudimentary, this forms China’s first viable sea leg for nuclear deterrence. China’s
is a strategic force organized around the pursuit of relative parity with the world’s top nuclear
powers for now; and pre-eminence across certain platforms for the future. Understanding the
nature of nuclear forces is critical to navigating the deterrence milieu. However, in today’s all
domain environment, the great enablers of strategic weapon systems and potential defenses,
space assets and cyberspace systems, require consideration.

30. Robert Ashley, “Statement for the Record,” DIA.
31. Caitlin Talmadge, “The U.S.-China Nuclear Relationship,” 4; Robert Ashley, “Statement for the Record,” DIA.
32. Caitlin Talmadge, “The U.S.-China Nuclear Relationship,” 5; Robert Ashley, “Statement for the Record,” DIA.
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Disposition of Enabling Capabilities
Tracking, signaling, and engaging assets and targets are all space-enabled elements of
traditionally deterrence-geared weapon systems. Cyberspace connects these space-based
components to their terrestrial end items. Of course, this depiction is crude and over-simplified.
However, the takeaway is that ballistic and hypersonic missile guidance and tracking systems
operate from space. Engage or launch on remote sophisticated capabilities are programmed off
space radars or satellite linkages to multiple ground-based radars. Those linkages are executed
across an increasingly difficult to secure cyber domain. Counter measure employment, aircraft
launching mechanisms, and anti-submarine warfare tracking systems are all reliant upon cyberspace. The more sophisticated Chinese strategic systems become, the more proficient and prolific
in these areas they will need to be. U.S. satellites or U.S. operated commercial satellites and
information technology infrastructures will not suit Chinese classified systems or operations.
U.S. systems are unsuitable because, ethics and litigiousness aside, U.S. systems and software
presumably provide the U.S. with access and expertise for exploiting information contained
therein. Operational security in an emerging great power competition pits China and the United
States against one another in space and cyberspace. U.S. ubiquity in these domains currently
demands offensive and defensive independence in each domain. Battlespaces without national
borders also make operating in space or cyberspace preferable for maintaining conflict below the
threshold of total warfare – a key intention of strategic deterrence. PLA strategy regards the
employment of space-based systems and the denial of space operations to adversaries as a central
component of warfare today.33 In fact, a major component of recent PLA reforms was the
creation of the Strategic Support Force (SFF). The CCP specifically designed the SFF to unify

33. Robert Ashley, “Statement for the Record,” DIA.
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space and cyberspace and extend power projection into these strategic frontiers. This pivot from
primarily land-based defense is essential to how the reformed PLA plans to fight and win The
SFF, like the Rocket Force, is an independent entity outside of the Chinese theatre commands.34
This force structure signifies the critical importance granted to the enabling mechanisms for
strategic operations, deterrence, and if required, strategic warfighting. Below are a few general
examples of space and cyberspace policy and capabilities to elaborate on the above.
Pursuant to the aforementioned strategic competition, China is developing antisatellite
capabilities to degrade key space-based support infrastructure of its adversaries.35 As China
works to catch up to the U.S. and others in space-based systems, it is more cost effective to patch
capabilities by neutralizing your enemy’s advantages; i.e. U.S. missile defense. Other counterspace capabilities include missile forces based on the ground, sea, or in the air; cyber warfare;
and on-orbit dual-use anti-satellite systems.36 Inter-atmospheric and space-based dual-use
systems are key for China’s deniability of making space a warfighting domain. China publicly
condemns warfighting in space, and obvious counter-space assets could bring condemnation,
sanctions, etc. Additional anti-satellite developmental capabilities include satellite jammers,
directed energy weapons, and kinetic kill vehicles (likely fielded).37 The satellite jammers are
somewhat of a crossover between cyber and space operations that the new construct of the SSF
serves well.
The 2007 and 2010 Chinese destruction of its own satellites and missiles in space as well
as the 2014 test of the anti-satellite missile system demonstrate Chinese strategy, capability and

34. John Costello and Joe McReynolds, “China's Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era,” National
Defense University Press, October 2, 2018, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1651760/chinasstrategic-support-force-a-force-for-a-new-era/.
35. Yogesh Joshi and Frank O'Donnell, India and Nuclear Asia, 82.
36. Robert Ashley, “Statement for the Record,” DIA.
37. Ibid.
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resolve in space-based strategic operations.38 A rising great power, China refuses to accept what
it calls the American monopolization of outer space.39 Furthermore, China views counter space
operations as playing a key role in counter third-party intervention during military conflicts.40
China is willing to demonstrate a strategic capability they would employ to deter U.S.
intervention. While the CCP does not publicly correlate the 2007, 2010, and 2014
demonstrations with deterrence, their policy allows for the logical connection. To diminish
further the U.S. “monopoly”, China is developing more capable space-based surveillance,
communications, and geo-location for more precise targeting options.41 China wants to leverage
its own systems for military or political purposes. Using U.S. based global positioning systems
or commercial satellites is likely not a sustainable or secure option in a conflict or deterrence
scenario that pits the two nations against one another. Beyond precise military missions, such as
targeting, China also seeks Chinse controlled surveillance and intelligence collection. In general,
the CCP leadership is bolstering space-based intelligence collection; satellite communication and
navigation, and human and robotic space operations.42 Chinese space-based operations serve a
myriad of missions. However, their connection to security operations, military strategy, and
deterrence are clear.
The PLA considers cyberwarfare a major element of any modern strategic force.43 This
seems banal as the “internet of things” now supports nearly all aspects of civilian sector - let
alone military sector operations. What is intriguing is the reorganization of dispersed PLA assets
to prioritize cyberwarfare as a necessary support mechanism to national strategy. In fact, the
38.
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Thérèse Delpech, Nuclear Deterrence, 148.
“China Military Power,” DIA, 40-41.
Yogesh Joshi and Frank O'Donnell, India and Nuclear Asia, 84.
Robert Ashley, “Statement for the Record,” DIA.
Michael Chase and Arthur Chan, China's Evolving Approach to "Integrated Strategic Deterrence" (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), Ch. 3.

15

primary function of the SSF is information operations with a major emphasis on cyber warfare.
The SSF has a dedicated round-the-clock cyber-espionage and cyber-sabotage team.44 Cyber
network attacks (CNA) and cyber network exploitations (CNE) are a daily occurrence in the
realm of U.S. information assurance. With organizations like SSF, the scale and organization of
CNA and CNE increase, and so the threat posed by those attacks increases.
Cyberwarfare is central to Chinese strategy when examining the DoD personnel Standard
Form 86 document breach. Another example of Chinese cyber strategy is the theft by the APT10
group of hundreds of gigabytes of sensitive data regarding aviation, space and satellite
technology, manufacturing technology, communications technology, computer processor
technology, etc.45 Some CNAs are probing rehearsals to test the resolve and redundancy of
firewalls. Other CNAs clearly are targeted missions. Both prove the utility China sees in cyber
campaigns. Attacks with Chinese originating internet protocol addresses even sought a strategic
advantage for the PLA by attempting to steal U.S. and Japanese anti-submarine warfare
technology.46 This technology undoubtedly could have been used to enable the freedom of
maneuver for the nascent sea-based leg of the Chinese nuclear triad. On the information
assurance and connectivity side of cyber operations, the PLA is modernizing its command and
control network specifically to operate its nuclear forces more effectively and quickly in a
crisis.47 Faster, better protected, and redundant networks are key to ensuring control over volatile
and existentially daunting nuclear weapons systems. The Chinese readily recognize this.
The previously mentioned jamming techniques of weapon systems are also a major
component of modern cyber warfare. If China can eliminate an adversarial advanced capability
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before it leaves the ground or before delivering its payload, then concepts like assured second
strike become much less of an abstract calculation. Like space, there is a clear marriage of
cyberspace, Chinese strategy, and strategic weapon systems. Moreover, the Chinese are investing
into these areas heavily and publicly refining their skills. Yet what, if any, opportunities exist
within developmental technology and these new domains for the United States to exploit in its
favor?

Assessment of Window of Opportunity
Despite the rapid advancement and mobilization of Chinese strategic capabilities, their
largely new and developmental nature provide a strategic window of opportunity to the United
States. The opportunity arises from the experienced and robust U.S. architecture, larger
stockpile, and Cold War arms race institutional experience. Chinese force reorganization, two of
three nuclear triad “legs”, fledgling joint and strategic operational concepts and organizations all
suggest a lack of a robust force and a lack of proficiency. Chinese declaratory policy and
national objectives, coupled with technological development projects provide the United States
with a somewhat clear intent of the future Chinese nuclear force composition. The United States
currently has a superior capability and force structure to that of the Chinese. The U.S. knows
where China intends to take its technological advancements and to what end. The gap in time it
will take for the CCP and PLA to realize those capabilities is a period of advantage that U.S.
leadership should not squander. The below delves further into the characteristics of various
strategic synapses that depict a critical preparatory period for the United States to advantage.
How the U.S. should exploit such an opportunity will be the topic of a separate section.
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Road-mobile ballistic missiles are problematic for targeting purposes. However, “China
still stores warheads separately from delivery vehicles in peacetime.”48 This means that
currently, China’s force structure has some built in lag-time, and potentially the warheads would
be targetable separately form the launch and delivery systems, simplifying the issue.
Additionally, not all of the road-mobile systems are ICBMs - capable of endangering U.S.
territory. If you subtract the non-mission capable systems from the relatively minimal ICBM
systems, the numbers may be somewhat manageable and suggest that the Chinese ground-based
nuclear posture is not yet strong enough to deter U.S. strategic pressure. It is worth mentioning
that the silo-based systems do not number enough to be survivable to a Soviet era type
counterforce-targeting plan. If China deploys MIRV enabled ICBMs, coupled with increased
long-range delivery vehicles and mobile launch platforms, which are all in development, their
ability to survive and respond to a nuclear threat may be too risky for a U.S. coercive gamble.
These survivable, reliable, and capable systems would prevent assurances of U.S. damage
limitation in a worst-case nuclear scenario. Luckily for American counterforce and deterrence
considerations, the Chinese ground force, the most robust leg of the Chinese triad, does not yet
prevent U.S. relative nuclear pre-eminence. Essentially, the U.S. is rightly confident that the
Chinese cannot inflict unacceptable damage to U.S. cities following an American first strike.
This security provides an opportunity for strategic latitude that may quickly dissipate.
Additionally, as the newly centralized elements of the Rocket Force and SSF will
become better practiced and integrated into the new theater commands. At that time, the Chinese
military will likely have the capacity to change standard operating readiness levels to co-locate
warheads and delivery systems. Furthermore, “a better trained, organized, and equipped PLA
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will be in a stronger position to accomplish its primary functions: winning modern wars... as the
PLA educates and trains commanders and staff to employ joint forces”.49 However, this is a goal,
not an operational reality for the PLA. As of 2019, the DIA estimated that China is not yet
practiced in this joint environment.50 Joint force readiness and synchronization affects all
branches of the triad, not just the ground forces. The command and control system refresh to
increase effective nuclear and strategic force employment points also to a current joint operating
deficiency. The “growing pains” in the current force organization and command structure add
additional impetus for the United States to shape a strategic dialogue before a more efficient
force lessens the CCP’s desire to compromise.
With respect to the sea leg of the fledgling nuclear triad, there is a present point of
inflection, as well. China’s nuclear submarine fleet is rather noisy and vulnerable to U.S. and
Japanese anti-submarine detection and defeat. In fact, in the event that deterrence failed, the U.S.
and its allies would likely be able to confine these submarines to waters within the first island
chain. From here, the JL-2 missile cannot range the continental United States, would be easier to
target, and serves as a weaker deterrent. However, China is working on an upgraded, quieter,
more efficient nuclear submarine as well as a longer-range JL-3 missile.51 China currently cannot
operate or negotiate from a position of an effective and survivable nuclear triad. The U.S. can
continue to not acknowledge them as a nuclear peer. The implications of China not being a
strategic peer is a better coercive position from which the U.S. can implement regional policy
with adjacent nations, reach a diplomatic agreement with China, or coerce a favorable outcome
in a policy matter if necessary. This potential success would be contingent upon quick action and
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organized strategy while the opportunity presents itself. Moreover, General Ashley describes
China’s blue water fleet development as allowing power projection and submarine protection
beyond the first island chain.52 This capability does not yet exist. China’s navy is still very much
a coastal force. The majority of naval and general military operations remain focused toward
potential conflict with Taiwan, and what some would term the near abroad.53 A Chinese blue
water navy will eventually inhibit our ability to deter anti-U.S. interests regionally and globally.
Global power projection and the associated strategic systems are certainly receiving a lot of
attention and funding endorsed from the highest levels of the party. Although, most of the
military industrial culture have not yet increased their policy scope accordingly. If the military
culture and the CCP are watching Taiwan, they are not yet focused on the United States. As
China’s global role increases, they will eventually need to broaden their aperture.
As mentioned above, the SSF is a construct of a rather new concept. Even internally, its
space and cyber forces seem to have competing conceptualizations. This could hinder their initial
effectiveness and organization in a military that is already somewhat bloated and overbureaucratized. Force integration at lower levels of administration within the newly established
SSF remains a challenge. Moreover, communication and clearly delineated roles and
responsibilities between the SSF and theatre commands will take some time to sort out.54 The
SSF is somewhat an amalgamation of pieces of United States Strategic Command, Cyber
Command, and the National Security Agency. Their newly centralized, cross-domain role will be
inefficient at first. The PLA and the CCP know that strategic integration and the new associated
constructs are more policy than procedure at this point in their development. They will likely
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close this gap through exercises and iterations of enforcing policy. The United States must
exploit the time it has to formulate a China-centric nuclear and strategic weapon system policy.
Once Chinese proficiency divests the U.S. temporal advantage, U.S. theater forces and diplomats
alike will lack the necessary time to proof and implement key tenants of whatever new policy
they deem necessary to deter conflict. The RAND Corporation provides insight into the
significance of understanding new technology implications prior to fully employing them: “in
relation to the problem of cyber-warfare, [we are] at the same stage of intellectual development
as we were in the 1950s in relation to possible nuclear war.”55 For new warfighting domains or
game changing technologies, such as CNE and CNA malware or hypersonic glide vehicles, U.S.
strategy needs time to adapt our operating picture to incorporate properly their utility or their
threat. The U.S. currently has the time to develop new capabilities, to understand their uses and
implications, and to field them smartly. If the U.S. security community does not seek to leverage
this strategic window, they will soon find themselves chasing the largest economy and most
rapidly advancing military in the world. The United States should not desire to be running behind
the fastest runner in the race. Proper planning, as much as technological innovation, can prevent
this.
Current Chinese nuclear posture revolves around a no first use (NFU) policy. This type of
policy relies on a high degree of ambiguity, deception, and mobility to support low force
numbers. China’s 2049 great power status goals along with its vast technological development
programs do not seem to support the tenants of its previous NFU policy. Moreover, their
operational restructuring to expand the import and ubiquity of nuclear forces seems to contradict
traditional Chinese nuclear policy. The closing window of opportunity for strategic action and
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negotiations for the United States spans beyond technological development. Very possibly, the
world is experiencing the final years of Chinese NFU, which would only complicate strategic
coercion or negotiations. Officers within the PLA write publicly to argue for conditions under
which the military should violate the NFU policy. Heightened readiness, streamlined strategic
decision making, launch on warning capabilities, and space-based early warning systems all
support an expanded concept for nuclear use.56 Deeper analysis within the PLA of scenario
driven events in which first use may be necessary also suggest the beginning of a shift in
strategic culture.57 Furthermore, there exists a growing strategic shift within the political and
PLA elite toward a more complete parity or deterrence of the Unites States as a peer.58 This
paper does not argue that any of the above is unreasonable, or unpredictable in a realist driven
international environment. Instead, it is most important to note that these discussions, goals, and
concepts may signal a shift in Chinese nuclear policy. This shift will lower the effectiveness of
U.S. nuclear deterrence, and so of U.S. coercive policy imposition on strategic matters. China is
seeking parity in that it is mirror imaging its force structure and capabilities with that of the
United States, as well as developing new capabilities to menace any U.S. calculation that may
suggest a nuclear exchange, particularly counterforce, could end in its favor. If China desires to
interact as a strategic equal with the United States, than the Unites States should forecast the
future implications, prepare the future force, and generally be prepared with policy goals and
initiatives. The U.S. needs to accomplish what it can prior to parity, and understand limitations
within the new status quo upon parity.
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Additionally, the U.S. must acknowledge that as parity approaches, deterrence may fail.
This should spark a more culturally tailored version of a Herman Kahn, or 1950s RAND-esque
assessment of actions upon failure; and how to re-establish deterrence. The strategic environment
is changing. China is one of our biggest strategic competitors, and soon it will likely be our
greatest. However, at the moment, China’s reliance on relatively limited ground assets, the
dynamic of their nascent nuclear triad, the developmental nature of their advanced capabilities,
and the still-present ability of the U.S. to limit damage and re-establish deterrence if necessary
provides an opportunity. The United States should take advantage of the remaining time it has to
plan for the future in order to maintain the strategic upper hand on China. Of course, U.S.
research and engineering elements should be vigorously at work to prevent a lasting parity.
These relative technological developments rely upon continued economic strength. The
following section will discuss the economic challenges China may face as it approaches parity
with the United States. That section will conclude with a final assessment of the aforementioned
window of strategic opportunity in light of Chinese economic dynamics.
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CHINESE ECONOMIC DISPOSITION AND OPPORTUNITY

Chinese Economic Strength
Earlier in this paper, I briefly alluded to the economic prowess of China. Because this
section has quite a bit of critique of the Chinese economy, it is important to state that
underestimating the CCP and the Chinese economy has not gone too well for naysayers in the
past. Not the Tiananmen Square protests and associated crackdown, nor the Falun Gong populist
movement, nor the Hong Kong “democratic” protests have slowed economic growth much.
However, I believe the demographic, structural, and political challenges facing China today to be
much more dynamic than the past 33 years. Yet, the reader should not underestimate the
resiliency of the CCP. From 1950 to 2010, only 10 countries achieved per capita gross domestic
product (GDP) growth of 6% annually that lasted longer than 10 years. China sustained 8.2% for
22 years.59 Obviously, the Chinese economy is consistently impressive. The last section went
over countless ways in which China may be spending its increased resources. When discussing
projections for relative strength between the U.S. and China, it merits an examination of the
Chinese economy to understand if continued economic, and so military growth can sustain, and
to what extent. Due to the sensational claims of unending and unimpeded growth, and impending
collapse, the following will examine the challenges facing the Chinese economy closely and
broadly. Within each sub-category of examination, we will determine if economic factors back
the assertion of a strategic capability window of action open to the U.S. vis-a-vis China. Former
Senior Military Fellow for NDU and former U.S Army attaché to Beijing and Hong Kong,
Dennis Blasko states, “All forms of national power…will be utilized in the pursuit of
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accomplishing the PRC’s objectives. China’s military doctrine continues to rely on the idea of
‘people’s war,’ as adapted for modern times, as a way to integrate the latent potential of China’s
economy and population into its military capabilities.”60 Informed conversation regarding
military capability and political objectives, particularly in China, cannot divest an economic
assessment from serious analysis. China stands as the second largest, and by most accounts, soon
to be largest economy in the world. Before we get into at what level this accomplishment will
continue to persist, it may be useful to delve into how China “arrived”.
China’s economic growth was powered by: an incentivized bureaucracy with limited to
no government imposed regulations, a call for growth over all other facets of development and
governance, and a government subsidy program to state owned enterprises to help invigorate
particular sectors. Large migrant worker populations allowed for low real wages for the
increasingly productive workforce, increased working age to dependent age populations, and
increased the number of workers per those working age. With a limited number of trans-national
immigrants, and a negative view of them in general, regional migration served the same function
for China on an immense scale. In certain key sectors, China was able to bridge developmental
industrial and technological gaps by reverse-engineering technology bought, borrowed, or stolen.
This type of acquisition in large part includes the Chinese nuclear acquisition. Rapid structural
changes to the national financial system created an abundance of jobs that helped guide and
boost population growth toward further economic growth.61 For instance, the government’s
lessening of economic and property control but maintenance of bureaucratic and key industry
control helped pivot macro-economic policy when necessary. Lastly, low dependency rates and
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the lack of a “middle-class” allowed for minimal social responsibility to the workforce. These
demographic dynamics also permitted aggressive and broad investment policies while creating a
state of unprecedented savings.62 The wide-scale savings served to keep inflation low throughout
this period. In light of such perfect demographic alignment and deft structural adjustments, why
should anyone posit challenges to this streamlined machine? The discussion that follows will
assert that much of what once worked in China’s favor demographically is beginning to hinder
progress.
Furthermore, economic achievements have reached a threshold that diminishes the same
old structural adjustments from stimulating real growth without massive macro-economic
adjustment internally or achievement externally. Additionally, certain political dynamics
complicate the pursuit and realization of such adjustments and achievements. Essentially, some
of the facets of its historically remarkable and unrivaled 35-year growth have reached macroeconomic tipping points and require plans for sustenance and mitigation measures for this
transition. The implementation of macro-level adjustments will provide a period of uncertainty
for the Chinese government and so a period of opportunity that will synchronize with the
capability period of opportunity described above. Chinese growth will inevitably slow, but to
what degree their trajectory of power slows depends on how capably they address the changing
demographic and structural dynamics of their nation. While they may be well prepared to lessen
the immediate effects of some of the transitions, their economic policy to sustain long-term
prosperity and prevent further recession remains in its nascent stages at this time. All of this
coalesces to a pause in certainty. Later in this paper, we will engage how deliberate U.S. action
at this time may be able to affect change in its favor.
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Middle Income Gap Challenges Facing China
All of the challenges that face China center around their ability or inability to overcome
the middle-income trap. At $15,000 a year per capita GDP, industry becomes less economical for
nations. China requires switching to a service-based economy to continue to grow efficiently as
it is at $16,000 purchasing power parity GDP and non PPP GDP, $12,000. This transition will
take China from a middle to a high-income economy. Succeeding in a service-based economy
requires a strong consumer base. China needs to either increase wealth distribution internally to
help consume goods, or it needs to create external opportunities to stimulate its economy if its
populace cannot.
20 years from now, China’s economy will likely be double its current size.63 This growth
does not necessary mean efficiency, nor is growth guaranteed. Much of this may be redirected
towards personnel targeted or structural targeted institutions due to massive demographic shifts
(discussed below). If expenditures continue to increase while the institutions that fueled growth
diminish, China’s increase will not necessarily translate into military or political power. China
recognizes the challenges ahead. Social stability and internal reform are the primary objectives of
the CCP in the near term.64 American rhetoric like that discussed coming from the DoD,
Congress, the State Department, all fears China’s perceived global power aspirations. Those
designs certainly exist. However, for the immediate future, China is prioritizing other goals to
help overcome the income gap and its associated implications – lest the CCP lose the mandate of
heaven. The mandate of heaven is an ancient Chinese concept whose main tenants are military
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strength and the feeding of the masses. The mandate carries serious implications for the staying
power of regimes in the eyes of the citizenry.
Overcoming the middle-income trap requires social restructuring and macro-economic
transition/pivoting, which is very difficult to do in a country of China’s size. The United States
cannot know with certainty whether China will successfully navigate such a critical
developmental period. The U.S. cannot really even assess how long it will take with certainty.
However, it can leverage the shifting of Chinese attention away from purely strategic goals to
complicate their political landscape and assert a favorable U.S. position.

Demographic Challenges Facing China
Beginning in 2014, the working age population declined from the previous year for first
time in China’s expansive growth. This decline in labor force will continue. Beginning in 10
years it will increase almost exponentially.65 The Chinese population is aging. This means less
workers available to power the economy. This demographic shift means increased costs to take
care of the elderly, and an increased percentage of the population caring for the elderly – which
even as a profession is not the type of work that tends to stimulate growth. This in itself is
perhaps the greatest factor imposing a time limit on China’s ability to transition from a
manufacturing economy to a knowledge and service-based system.
Further complicating workforce shortages is the slowing of the migration of workers
from rural areas to the cities.66 This population previously served as a never-ending stream of
inexpensive labor akin to the mass waves of European immigration into the United States
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throughout the late 19th and 20th centuries. Those migrant workers that choose to remain require
basic medical care, life support services, and housing. However, they currently cannot afford to
live in the cities.67 This creates social pressure on local governments and strain on the basic
provision of civil services across cities. If left unattended, such crises could cause cities to be less
desirable, lead to costly inefficiencies in transportation or other civil services, or even civil
unrest. With cities gaining on average two million citizens per year,68 inelastic rural populations
mean that cities must spend money to increase the incentives for people to want to work at the
jobs that most effectively drive the economy. The Chinese can no longer rely on countless
numbers of cheap labor either willing to return to the countryside for life support, or willing to
work for less than those trying to establish themselves in the cities. Lastly, this issue has the
obvious ramification of requiring wage increases and other incentives. While greater wealth
distribution is a hallmark of a service-based economy, this will temporarily cause China’s
economy to slow, and could cripple certain industrial hubs altogether. Issues of overcrowding in
major cities can also lead to limited real estate for new industry and businesses. Overcrowding
could harm an already burdened ecological system, and lead to food shortages or disease. China
has some major demographic issues that will diminish its profit margins and increase social
welfare and urban planning costs all at a time when profit is most essential for the continued
strength of the society.
A review of the above justifies China’s inward focus. Demography is the single greatest
factor that makes China’s future one of expenses, social responsibilities, and uncertainties. The
Unites States, which will age less rapidly than many Asian states largely thanks to immigrant
populations, should take this time to plan a nuclear strategy. The U.S. should seek to gain
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international or at least East Asian regional legitimacy before an economically secure China
thrusts upon them a strategic reality largely divested of U.S. interests. Regardless, demographic
dynamics create a moment of inward focus and likely slowed growth for China.
Further demographic complications that shift focus from strategic weapons systems and
policy are wealth distribution and social responsiveness. We already described a little about how
those fueling the economy cannot afford to live where they are now attempting to settle. This is a
characteristic of the massive wealth disparity that exists between the rich and the poor. China has
one of the largest wealth disparities of countries with similar GDP. Consumption as a percentage
of GDP is also lower than any other major global economy.69 Wealth distribution matters beyond
complicating local governance. A more equitable distribution of wealth increases consumer
bases for a service economy, and increases advanced education geared towards high income
economy enterprises. Additionally, there are negative implications for the legitimacy of any
government, particularly a socialist government, for poor civil services and wealth disparities.
Traditionally, the CCP is very concerned with its image and portraying its legitimate rule. The
question of legitimacy will likely lessen attention and funds to security matters.
Another factor associated with demography and governmental responsiveness is
ecological improvement. China spurred growth at all costs. Unregulated environmental
degradation means that certain rivers do not flow to their deltas some years; that cities have
harmful air quality; and that drinking water is often contaminated. The most significant affect is
on agricultural production.70 China historically struggles to feed its population as the western
portion of its landmass is largely arid or mountainous or both. Overcrowding of cities, coupled
with agricultural degradation in a nation without agro surpluses is another recipe for questions of
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legitimacy. China’s government increasingly is concerning itself with environmental degradation
and its social implications.71 This period of concern could directly hinder the defense industry or
indirectly draw attention from it. Demographic issues related to uniquely Chinese characteristics
as it approaches the middle-income gap should pull attention and resources from strategic
matters. Despite the outcome of this dynamic situation, the United States should at least have a
brief period to address nuclear strategy as one of its national priorities during a time when it may
be beyond the CCP’s grasp of equal attention.

Structural Challenges and Initiatives
China cyclically reinvigorated its growth by incentivizing the bureaucracy to take capital
from national banks and invest it in state owned enterprises (SOE) - with almost no interest or
requirements placed upon the sum. This essentially gave certain key industries free money, and
helped stimulate plateaus in growth with a massive internal investment stream.72 This process is
crudely akin to large-scale state-sponsored insider trading. It depended largely on the immense
amounts of capital the Chinese people saved in Chinse banks, as well as an economy that was
less open to the global “free market” and less susceptible to its forces. Demographic shifts,
described above, are causing the Chinse people to save less money, which limits large-scale bank
investments, and drives interest higher on this previous model of bureaucratic incentives.73
Additionally, as China opens up more to the global economy, stimulating state owned enterprises
is proving only to create artificial growth and not lasting economic growth as it once did.
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For instance, in the 2008 global financial crisis, China lessened the blow on its economy
and key state industries by using this model to invest $600 billion into SOEs. This proved to be
an artificial patch as now China has an immense surplus of finished goods with no actual demand
or consumers to purchase them. The tapering of inflation will also resume its climb without
proper stimulation.74 This surplus is driving China to pressure current trade partners and look for
new partnerships to consume these goods. Ultimately, the Chinese will need to expand their
consumer base to stimulate continued high levels of growth. Projects like the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), or civil military integration (CMI) are potential avenues for external and
increased demand. The BRI is long-term and somewhat uncertain, while enticing multinational
Chinese companies to support and propel military innovation – CMI - will require some cultural
adjustment. Complicating this matter, “China’s senior leaders recently reaffirmed their
commitment to CCP control over the state-led economic apparatus, including through statedirected investment and innovation.”75 Adjusting the senior leader culture to understand the new
demands on the Chinese economy by the global market, and how the old bureaucratic model of
investment will need to adapt, will take time. Finding external consumers and stimulus to
continue to invigorate Chinese growth into the future, will take time. This major economic
priority will also draw CCP leadership away from raw security strategy. The CCP may become
desperate for the success of particular economic programs, which provides a different type of
opportunity. The above rather technical and specific review depicts another avenue of economic
change that supports the assessment of a potential window of strategic opportunity for the United
States.
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Furthermore, China is seeking largely external initiatives to shock its economic structure
from its current plateau. These initiatives may very well serve to reinvigorate stellar growth rates
and make China the economic center of the Eastern Hemisphere. However, these programs face
their challenges and growing pains that make their immediate success uncertain. China should
remain somewhat vulnerable economically compared to the past and prior to some of these
initiatives “paying off”. This vulnerability may make the CPP more suggestable to the political
and policy goals of the U.S.
The Belt and Road Initiative essentially seeks to re-establish the Great Silk Road and the
associated economic corridor. The eventual goal would be to redefine regional economics around
Chinese financial institutions and Chinese currency. The long-term goals would be to help revise
Western global financial institutions in favor of China.76 The BRI faces many operational
complexities including: challenges form local governments, transiting through disputed territory,
major competitors that may seek to block the initiative (such as India), an immense scale of
investment and transnational support the project requires in light of more recent Chinese
economic plateauing.77 The DIA assesses the BRI as also pursuing influence over nations to
align their interests with China and deter criticism or conflict over sensitive policy matters.78
Should the BRI succeed on the scale China hopes, the political influence the United States can
exercise due to its economic and security roots in the region will decrease. Border nations that
hedge against a powerful China with the U.S. security umbrella and associated investments may
be reluctant to oppose China or maintain neutrality if China comes to dominate the region
economically. Even if some sort of combination of significant U.S. regional influence and
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Chinse influence becomes reality, the U.S. may find itself currently at the height of its regional
power. This would be the perfect time to negotiate, create precedence, come to agreements, sign
deals, or move forces into or out of appropriate operational positions.
Another dynamic present in such geographically dispersed initiatives with China as the
lead state is the security of those initiatives against piracy, terrorism, civil unrest, natural
disasters, and other forms of disruption. DIA posits that these rolls will fall to the PLA.79 The
PLA does not currently have the proper structure nor likely the requisite experience to support a
dispersed project of this scale – let alone approval from partner nations to enter their borders and
secure Chinese investments. This logistical complexity adds another development snag to the
BRI. This snag further elongates the window available to the U.S. before such an initiative may
reverse structural and demographic challenges. Once beyond its challenges, China may not feel
the need to negotiate at all with the U.S. regarding nuclear policy and regional strategy.
As a brief aside, it is worth mentioning that China does not currently “dominate” trade or
investment in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region. China is one of the
four main investors and trade partners with ASEAN - along with the United States, the European
Union (EU), and Japan. In fact, the EU is the primary investor, and injects more capital than the
U.S. and China combined.80 Additionally, out of all of the ASEAN nations only two economies
rank as highly dependent on China: Malaysia and Taiwan.81 Malaysia is a neutral nation and
Taiwan is vehemently anti-Chinese. Clearly economic dependence does not necessarily beget
political dependence. These statistics matter because there is an image that China has already
attained economic domination of its region. Western rhetoric often asserts that most nations rely
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on China to a high degree; and that they impose political will through these economic
connections. Currently, the United States and its close military and economic allies make up
three out of four key ASEAN investors and trade partners. U.S. economic influence and ability to
set regional strategic objectives is very much alive and well. If China can overcome the middleincome gap issues and continue to grow, this dynamic will diminish but likely not go away
entirely. This information backed by statistical analysis serves as evidence that now is the time
for the U.S. to attempt to better prepare for regional nuclear/strategic weapon system dynamics.
Other regional incentives that may counter the economic conditions that provide the U.S.
with a period of strategic opportunity essentially follow the dynamics of the BRI, described
above. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a proposed economic
agreement between the ASEAN nations and five regional partners. To oversimplify, this deal
hopes to reduce the cost of doing business and provide special partnerships and incentives to the
agreement’s members. This deal would be the largest economic agreement of its kind, in history.
However, India’s recent decision to withdrawal from the deal is in part due to their belief that it
would essentially lead to China unfairly advantaging the Indian economy for capital gain. Indian
withdrawal complicates balancing Chinese influence in RCEP for countries such as Japan.82
Other nations who likely share similar sentiments to Japan and India may be hesitant to enter into
the deal, or enter into it as freely as before now that it has lost a bit of momentum and scope.
Certainly, this has prolonged the negotiations of the deal. In the very least, this prolonged
negotiation period provides the U.S. time and opportunity to maneuver within the region before a
major partnership potentially chips away at its influence.
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The informal financial partnership and banking construct that formed on the sidelines of
the G20 know as “BRICS” (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), is another institution
seeking to decrease U.S. financial influence and increase Chinese (and member) influence. This
organization signals a desire for a more inclusive or even regionally based international system.
However, it does not hold much authority or capital. Moreover, its members at times are closer
with the West and its institutions than each other.83 The informal institution that China hopes will
help grant it enough international economic influence to counter its domestic challenges, is not
exactly poised to right demographic or structural issues of the largest nation on earth.

U.S. State of the Union and Opportunism
The previous section goes over the various ways the CCP must sort certain demographic
and structural issues that are stalling the “inevitable” Chinese domination of East Asian or global
economics and politics. At the moment, China’s political culture and economic growth provide
the perfect opportunity to plan a counter-Chinese technological, operational, and political
strategy. Hard and soft economic data currently reflect a strong U.S. economy, and project
strength throughout 2020. Military investment is breaking records year after year with bi-partisan
support for widespread spending in the form of the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA). The Congressional statements in the introduction to this paper show a rare bipartisan
support within majoritarian political issues. Their agreement is that China is an aggressor against
the United States, and our defense spending must prepare for this. With the Chinese economy
and external strategic imperatives somewhat stalled or secondary in priority, the U.S.
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environment is ideal to unify support behind a national initiative. The executive and legislature
must move beyond calling simply for technological advances. They need to detail how those
advances should be flexible strategically, how they need to be employed, and what the associated
diplomatic strategy needs to be. During the Cold War, there was agreement that the Soviet Union
was our enemy and that we needed to couple resources and man-hours to out strategize them.
Whether you agree with the rhetoric, or with the NDAA, the political atmosphere is ready for a
new wave of strategic thought. However, this section follows the discussion of technological
capability in part to signify the reliance of research and engineering upon a foundation of
resources. Abstract analysis and war-gaming to combat China’s rise will mean nothing if the
U.S. economy shrinks continuously while the Chinese economy grows conversely. Dr. James
Kurth, former professor of strategy at the Naval War College where he received the Medal for
Meritorious Civilian Service; and senior fellow and member of prominent think tanks in
Philadelphia, New York, and London, posits:
Underneath most of the strategic options of the United States lies a fundamental
assumption —and perhaps a fatal ﬂaw— and that is that some-how the United
States will be able to maintain and modernize its military forces… so that they
can serve as a creditable counterpart to the rising Chinese military. For this
assumption to remain sound, however, the United States must also maintain and
modernize its economy, and particularly its industry, so that it can provide the
necessary weapons systems and budgetary expenditures to support its military. 84
Despite the promise the current technological/political and economic disposition of China
presents the United States, we will be standing before a fire with no hose if our economic
prowess wanes. The two most prominent RAND intellectuals that shaped Cold War deterrence
theory, and that still shape the fundamental questions of deterrence today, were a physicist and
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an economist. The most prevalent theory in the U.S. belonged to the economist. This is a crude
characterization, but nonetheless it identifies the critical importance of economic factors on
strategy. The next section will examine Cold War strategy to determine the efficacy of this type
of thought and its applicability to the current milieu between the United States of America and
the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
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COLD WAR DETERRENCE THEORY: RECAPTURING EXPERTISE FOR CURRENT
USE

The opportunity seems to exist for U.S. strategy to coincide with armament innovation to
prevent significantly expanded Chinese force posture and operations. The Pentagon and
Congress recognize the implications of the growing Chinese threat. Public statements and policy
documents support rapid advanced technological development. Calculated and intentional
employment of these new systems in a way tailored to the disposition of Chinese forces and
culture is equally as necessary. While the strategy of the Cold War may have been imperfect, it
was constant. Legislators and policy makers spoke the language of theorists like Herman Kahn
and Thomas Schelling. Concepts of nuclear deterrence such as survivability, damage limitation,
assured destruction, assured second strike, escalation rungs, etc. - while often misquoted were
nevertheless ubiquitous in the media and to some extent the general populace. The question I will
examine below is how effective was this type of comparatively advanced strategic
contemplation. This section will seek to prove that high-level strategic thought was very
effective at rightly organizing and preparing the U.S. against the adversarial strategic threat. It
will postulate characteristically why this type of strategy was successful. Lastly, I will discuss if
this type of policy development is applicable to the U.S. – China security environment.

Rightly Ordered Cold War Documentation and Practice
“The Long Telegram”, as it came to be known, was essentially an intelligence estimate
based off an intimate study of political climate, culture, policy, and somewhat from supporting
force posture for that policy. This document was detailed and well informed. George Kennan’s
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telegram was so logically based on a strategic assessment that it set the tone for the containment
policy and a similar mode of assessment throughout the Cold War. The telegram reviewed basic
features of post-war Soviet outlook, background for that outlook, its projection in practical
policy on an official level, its projection on an unofficial level, and practical deductions or
recommendations from a U.S. policy standpoint.85 Notice that the telegram depicted sections of
tailored top-level political culture. In a post-World War II milieu, force structure would have
been a readily suggestible and somewhat knowable undertone with respect to this recent U.S.
ally. However, it is not one of the sections Kennan completed to inform his President of the
world-shaping policy imperatives facing the U.S. This Soviet specific and in-depth strategic type
of assessment drove home the urgency of the document’s recommendation. More importantly, it
formulated a policy that most would agree significantly contributed to ultimate American
success.
Kennan’s reasonable and convincing strategic assessment matriculated throughout the
US. Government. Its legacy led to the establishment (indirectly) of a science advisory steering
committee with a technology capabilities assessment panel. This document laid out a timetable
of relative force posture development between the U.S. and Russia. The purpose for this was
apparent, “to clarify the effects of evolving technology on our military position relative to
Russia… inherent in the development of technology over the next decade or so.”86 This 1950s
policy provided context and direction to technology development beyond the costly model of
matching capabilities.
The steering committee’s projections for the Cold War were as follows:
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Period I—The Present Phase: we have an offensive advantage but are vulnerable
to surprise attack…
Period II (Starting 1956/57—Ending 1958/60): We will have a very great
offensive advantage relative to USSR and will be less vulnerable than previously
to surprise attack…
Period III This is a period of transition from Period II to Period IV involving the
occurrence in some order of the following characteristics: The development of
advanced weapon capabilities by the Soviets…Substantial strengthening of U.S.
defenses...Continued improvement in U.S. delivery capabilities…
Period IV (Indefinite in length; possibly beginning within a decade):
An attack by either side would result in mutual destruction. This is the period
when both the U.S. and Russia will be in a position from which neither country
can derive a winning advantage87
These periods defined how the U.S. envisioned the nuclear dynamics of the Cold War. While the
estimated dates may have been inaccurate, their conceptual chronology and framework were
critical tools in planning for the challenges of the Cold War. However, for the utility of the
policy maker, the panel textured their characterization so much further. Each period discussed
specific capability characteristics, and effects or implications on policy and the security
environment therein. The periods included friendly and adversarial assessments of operational
latitude for certain provocations or security actions, and even recommendations for further
analysis and study.88 The work by this panel was good strategy because it identified a problem,
extrapolated its conditions for long-term planning, looked realistically at the nature of the
problem, and provided a series of conditional actionable guidelines for navigating the problem.
Conditional analysis is key when dealing with uncertainty, lest the nuclear force ends up
prepared for a very specific and never occurring posited eventuality. Moving beneath the
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theoretical to a call for specific actions within specific periods is also key. This process charges
subordinate elements and bodies with tangible goals. Abstract conjecture alone cannot win a war.
Furthermore, reactive technological development tends to pigeonhole new systems to
single purposes. Limited systems may find themselves behind a threat that pivots as the counter
technology gets released - and behind at a great cost. Beyond potential technological
obsolescence, continuously reacting to foreign force developments creates a myriad of costly
projects without overarching control or assessment of what is most imperative or feasible. To
determine this, a desired end state is necessary. The development requires a context of the
environment of employment, and strategically what the system needs to establish or re-establish
based on dynamic security policy. This panel was acutely aware that a framework for
comparison was critical for complex analysis and planning. With finite resources and the risk of
strategic surprise, informed organization techniques keep planning bodies and policy makers on
task. These techniques generally help with visualizing complex problems. Unfortunately, the U.S
is currently engrossed in a period of reactive technological development. The U.S. stands amidst
phase one of two or three, etc., and largely shows a lack of impetus to move beyond this current
step in the process of strategizing.
Each of the U.S. Congress people quoted in this paper’s introduction recognized a threat
from a different perspective. If the DoD could once again articulate a phased methodology that
classified threats and broad strategic responses beyond technologically complex explanations,
they would likely find resonance of their mission within the legislature and their electorate. With
the background of Soviet policy and designs, the U.S. assessed relative force postures and the
projections for those forces. This led to a time bound and particularized plan of action that
formulated the superstructure of nuclear strategy throughout the Cold War. This articulated
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framework gave intellectuals, engineers, and policy makers a platform for discussion. The
discussion helped prepare a metric system for gauging long-term efficacy of policymaking. This
became part of the culture of the political and nuclear elite of the time. The policy that came
forth from those elite was better because of it. Now we will look at a sample of the continued
complex and detailed development of strategy within the Cold War.
Mindful of period two above, U.S. Policy makers were taking advantage of the assessed
lack of vulnerability, to war game further active and passive defense measures. A few days prior
to the publishing of the well-know Gaither Report in 1957, the council that developed the report
met with the President. White House staff entered that conference into the official record by way
of a memorandum. This was another instance of academic analysis driving force investments due
to the “growing power of Soviet forces”.89 Recognizing that during the current nuclear “period”
the U.S. could deliver a “greater blow”, the council was assessing five years into the future when
true strategic vulnerability might come based on Soviet capability advancement. The council
found that the U.S. “must educate our people for the scientific and technological needs, and must
also educate our people so they will support what is required… The President said that groups
must be organized throughout universities, business groups, and other elements…to put across
the needs of the situation.90 Essentially, by navigating the comparative framework for projected
implications of losing preeminence, and sounding that against intelligence, the council was
assessing future needs. This merging of academic and strategic thought recommended the
investment into what became science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM)
programs. Recognizing a deficiency, critical analysis helped ensure technical proficiency for
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generations into the future (through federal interest in STEM education). The educational focus
of this initiative and its long-term scope is not particularly characteristic of a Joint Staff or DoD
solution. Yet, thinking strategically beyond near-term weapon-system prototyping birthed the
next generation of developers and technically proficient strategists.
The 1957 Gaither report, released three days later dealt primarily with assessing the
efficacy of defense measures and deterrent capability of our retaliatory forces. Again, prior to
allocating funding, the decision makers in the national capital region desired informed theory.
The report found that the Strategic Air Command (SAC) provided the primary deterrence for the
U.S. population. Yet, SAC was significantly vulnerable to Soviet surprise attack. Some
prescriptions included specific force increases for ICBMs and other ballistic missiles, various
hardening measures for the defense of the force, fielding a sea leg of the triad to bolster
deterrence, and the report bound most of these measures for completion by 1958 or 1959.91 This
analysis identified where the United States needed to focus efforts. Were the specific measures
eventually employed just enough, too much, maybe not enough, or was the U.S. simply lucky?
Unfortunately, the efficacy of deterrence is hard to claim because one cannot prove a negative.
However a scientific and intelligence based assessment found a weakness in deterrence, that our
counterparts were likely to exploit – or so we thought. Increasing and improving ICBMs,
hardening SAC forces, and adding a sea leg to our nuclear triad undoubtedly made our nuclear
forces more survivable and more effective. These elements likely contributed to deterrence at the
time. Regardless, offering deadlines, specific force goals, and a responsible agent to execute,
helped these goals quickly become official funded policy. Today, our strategic weapons policy
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documents do not often offer such actionable metrics coupled with clearly charged offices. This
report bolstered what became the most critical element of our nuclear deterrence. Policymakers
and lawmakers alike continue to agree on the importance of its tenants.
The aforementioned policy planning was not unique to the early cold war. National
Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 242 was the employment of modified measures
originally investigated in the National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 169, on U.S.
nuclear policy or posture. NSDM 242 did not only follow NSSM 169, it followed Presidential
Directives (PD) 18, 41, 53, 57, and 58 - and 59 shortly succeeded it. These are certainly not the
only relevant studies or nuclear policy documents of the seventeen years between the Gaither
Report and NSDM 242, just the best known. The very fact that U.S. leadership studied,
evaluated, and amended nuclear policy in a significant way every two years, stands in contrast to
our post-Cold War once every 10 year argument to keep nuclear weapons. NSDM 242 stated that
should nuclear deterrence fail, the U.S. needed to prepare to terminate war as quickly as possible
and at the lowest level of conflict as possible. This objective required planning a wide range of
limited nuclear employment and targeting measures to use in conjunction with political and other
military action to control escalation.92 The very intent of Cold War nuclear warfighting planning
for the U.S. was to control escalation of such existentially menacing weapons. While deterrence
remained an imperfect gamble, the U.S. afforded considerable attention and assets to limiting the
potential for assured destruction through NSDM 242. This memorandum more specifically called
to maintain reserve nuclear forces, increase the amount of particularly costly Soviet targets, and
limit the damage to U.S. forces and infrastructure.93 The document took the findings of a study
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and laid out courses of action to rectify force deficiencies. The memorandum set the tone for
U.S. posture and dialogue from 1974 through the end of the Cold War. In depth analysis and
complex strategic planning allowed the U.S. to pursue tailored courses of action that presumably
maintained deterrence. This policy further confounded the adversary with questions of parity.
Equally as important, the document goes on to say:
Within three months, the Secretary of Defense shall present for Presidential
review an initial set of limited employment options. At quarterly intervals
thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall present for Presidential review a
summary of available options and an analysis of any additional recommended
options. Each presentation should include illustrative scenarios for each limited
employment options.94
I kept this quote in full because it once again demonstrates the specific and confident
requirements that came from an intellectual and well-maintained strategic tradition. These
documents did not banter over the purpose of the dialogue, it navigated a robust tradition, and
expanded on an in depth study. Lastly, it had specific requests and requirements to execute
quickly its intent. Great power competition seems to necessitate this kind of quick analysis,
accountably, and speed in response.
A few years later, in 1980, PD-59 elaborated on specific upgrades to weapon systems and
an increase and modification to the targeting tactics and procedures.95 The United States took
further measures regarding what to do if deterrence failed. At the time, the U.S. believed that the
Soviets had a robust nuclear war concept.96 We know now this assessment of the Soviets was
correct. The tradition of evolving policy to match the adversary and parry it when necessary was
successful. Success was in the usurping of the Soviet policy advantage through deep strategic
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analysis superimposed on nuclear force posture. In fact, one month after the release and leak of
PD-59, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote a letter to the President. In this letter he was addressing the
concerns regarding overturning of previous policy with the endorsement of PD-59. Mr.
Brzezinski very effectively provides the intentional narrative throughout each major nuclear
policy document of the previous 20 years or so. He explains their implications, and why our
nuclear force posture required each one.97 What is incredibly evident in this description is the
continuity of intentional, tailored policy. This tradition led to a non-partisan continuity of much
of the actual policies, themselves. This kind of unity of process and objective allowed for a much
more coherent, well-practiced nuclear policy during the Cold War. These documents are not just
relics of an obscure nuclear thing. They are evidence of an intellectual tradition, that while
flawed at times, critically analyzed and implemented policy with an efficiency and proficiency
largely lost in today’s reemergence of great power politics.

Responding to General Deterrence Criticism
The opponents of deterrence are more so opponents of some of the deterrence concepts
from the Cold War. Mostly the assumption of reciprocal applicability of what could reasonably
deter the U.S. political machine would deter the Soviet political machine. Since the collapse of
the Soviet Union, declassified documentation proved that this mirror imaging of perceptions was
often incorrect. Deterrence expert Keith Payne characterizes this sentiment well, “Nevertheless,
confident assertions and promises continue unabated predictably…such assertions and promises
should now be recognized as hubris” (Payne, Gamble Ch. 7).98 To be clear, this is not the kind of
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theorizing this paper suggests or champions from the Cold War. This type of truncated analysis
and mirror imaging seeks to shorten the exhaustive and tailored intellectual process Dr. Payne
and the fourth section of this paper claim is so central to effective deterrence. Informed dialogue,
routine studies, and responsive force structures, along with synchronized science, policy, and
theory are the tenants of Cold War deterrence thought. Such a tradition seems so central to what
in fact prepared America to parry the Soviet Union. “Further… there is no logical basis for
anticipating that China could be inspired by Schelling’s reciprocal fear of surprise attack to strike
first at U.S. retaliatory forces. Unless the U.S. behaves very foolishly by abandoning its
retaliatory capabilities.”99 Payne’s error here is that he assumes a proficiency of strategic or
nuclear deterrence thought that I would argue the United Sates largely has lost; and that China is
only beginning to have. In fact, without reference to Chinese strategic culture and a
contextualization of scenario-based analysis, this assumption seems based upon a largely
Western rationality. His, and many others’, initial critique disproves the very common second
assertion above. Payne, a critic of simplified and culturally projected modes of deterrence,
concludes his analysis by stating: “for the purposes of post-Cold War deterrence, it is important
to know the opponent to the extent feasible, acknowledge that which is not known, and to
establish deterrence policies informed by what can be known about the specific opponent’s
beliefs and modes of thought.”100 This type of deterrence policy is the kind my study seeks to
engage. Uninformed or premature presumptions are in fact the enemy of deterrence.
Unfortunately, these were characteristics in Cold War deterrence theory. However, much of the
architecture of Cold War deterrence is valuable, yet absent today.
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This paper delves into the constructs of deterrence because “as long as nuclear weapons
exist, deterrence appears to be the most— some would say the only—acceptable policy, far
better than any possible alternative (such as blackmail, intimidation, coercion, or actual use).”101
Deterrence is often a system of purposeful ambiguity and, thanks to operational security, almost
never explicitly acknowledged as successful. So why bother? The answer is the scale and
implications of the devastating effects of a nuclear detonation. Delpech goes on to say, “Ideas
have consequences. So does a lack of them. During the Cold War, a mixture of deterrence,
containment, conventional capabilities, and arms control seemed successful in preventing a
nuclear exchange with the Soviets. Luck may have played a part as well.”102 All of the tools at
the disposal of a government exist to obtain its objectives. Militaries provide security and
coercive force. The design and posture of these forces is to both deter wars and win them.
Strategists must plan for both. As Brodie acknowledges above, conventional modern wisdom
puts a stronger emphasis on deterrence versus warfighting. Even prominent statesman and
intellectual Henry Kissinger stated that “negotiations are less about arms or control than about
strategy”.103 As the U.S. conceives its next generation of arms control, technological pursuits,
and deterrence mechanisms, it must unify behind an overarching strategy to maximize their
coherence and applicability.

Cold War Deterrence’s Potential for Current Resonance
There still exists an opportunity between the United States and China to apply strategic
analysis, dialogue, and deterrence. Nations with an established trust to some degree, and who
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operate joint security environments together need not worry about how to deter the other from
aggressions very unlikely to occur. States hell-bent on warfare ignore deterrence. Everything in
between these architypes allows for the possibility of the efficacy of deterrence. The United
States and China openly state that they do not wish to go to war with the other. The DIA in a
report to the U.S. Congress assess, “China’s leaders employ tactics short of armed conflict to
pursue China’s strategic objectives through activities calculated to fall below the threshold of
provoking armed conflict with the United States, its allies and partners, or others in the IndoPacific region.”104 China’s economic rise precipitated from the current world order. With their
need to overcome the middle-income gap, China will likely await further stability at home before
upsetting the status quo. For instance, the current trade war with the Unites States in part caused
the Chinese economy to plateau. If China cannot rely on a strong economy to provide the vehicle
for demographic and structural reform, they risk a GDP not commensurate with a highly
developed society.
The tenuous period of Chinese fragility described in the second section provides a
window where the Chinese will be more likely to accept a model of deterrence rather than a
shaky international policy resting upon an unstable domestic situation. Moreover, as China seeks
to become a world leader worthy of greater prestige and recognition, a modern account of
prestige may drive the Chinese away from desiring direct, heated conflict. “In the present,
peaceful pursuits and qualities, such as network centrality, cultural radiance… sporting prowess,
language or the revelations of a rich and creative history, are more likely to realize national
prestige…Quality and credibility in commercial, technological, [and] cultural spheres engender
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prestige.”105 Real defense capability and force posture has always been a component of power.
However, now there are elements of power obtained through international recognition and
admiration. Those states who play the role of antagonists become “rogue” or sanctioned - which
hurts economic potential. Perhaps China’s desire for greater recognition may not necessitate raw
power dynamics and conflict. This likely means that China will be open to some form of
negotiation, arms control, or declared force postures in an attempt to be cooperative and avoid a
loss of face internationally. This environment would only assist the deterrence regime.
A 1955 intelligence estimate described a Soviet-U.S. relationship ripe for stability
through deterrence:
Faced with a world situation increasingly inhospitable to their aims, the Soviet
leaders began to seek a way to restore their maneuverability short of the
alternative extremes of war… these leaders have become less openly belligerent
… and have made a series of conciliatory gestures… The [Soviets] … sought …
to convince the Free World that is possible to establish conditions of ‘mutual
trust.’106
If the Chinese truly wish to resist war, then history would suggest that there will be opportunities
to apply deterrence for stability’s sake. The U.S. also needs to work to re-establish this type of
milieu to increase the potential efficacy of deterrence. This paper demonstrated that in all
likelihood the Chinese economy will surpass that of the U.S. Emeritus professor at the London
School of Economics, Barry Buzan asserts. “The West as a whole, and the U.S. in particular,
need to accept that they no longer own the future.”107 The U.S. should lessen some of its
recalcitrance toward the Chinese at all levels of government. Strict aversion is more akin to
Stalin’s not one-step backward proclamation than actual strategy. Simply put, the United States
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cannot function in a system it does not accept. Should China eventually obtain near nuclear
parity, parity, or marginal preeminence, an ill-prepared United States will struggle to control the
strategic atmosphere. The U.S. should pursue a long-term strategy that accepts the changing
global dynamic instead of purely fighting it. This will create an environment more permissible to
preventing strategic-level conflict – the intent of deterrence. The current strategic environment
requires the informed deterrence engaged in the Cold War. The U.S. needs to accept this so that
it can lead the effort, and hopefully control the relationship.
Historically, projections of material power are notoriously unreliable as it relates to total
factor productivity and roles in international politics.108 Chinese analysts, like American analysts,
will be aware of the limited margins of certainty in economic and especially political power
projections. This should make the Chinese receptive to forms of conflict short of warfare. The
Chinese creation of the SFF, a USSTRATCOM-like body, shows their devotion to strategic level
thought and planning. A key component of this, and historically the most emphasized
component, is deterrence. The Chinese should absolutely be receptive to a revitalized U.S
intellectual architecture for long-term strategy to help inject stability and preparation. Dong
Wang, professor at the School of International Studies, Peking University, China; and head of
the Institute on China-U.S. People to People Exchange, Peking University, China, believes it
naïve, even dumb for China to make America feel insecure. He recommends that China do as
much as it can to avoid conflict, share respect, and cooperate.109 Insecurity in a nuclear
environment could lead to enticements for pre-emptive use. This insecurity in a new arms race
with an economically and technologically capable China could have catastrophic consequences.
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Becoming more efficient at destroying forces and taking lives without vigorous intellectual
control is careless. With China seeking to avoid conflict and maybe even avoid their normal
opacity, the environment is ripe for a Cold War type deterrence architecture.
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UNDERSTANDING DETERRENCE AND CHINA: A STRATEGIC CULTURE
ASSESSMENT

Towards the end of the last section, I discussed that the critics of Cold War deterrence
models found issue with mirror imaging cultural ideas to neatly justify suppositions as the
foundational elements for strategy. Cold War strategic analysis was comprehensive. It created a
language and frame of mind that allowed for informed national debate regarding nuclear force
posture. Such analysis is still relevant to the dynamics between China and the United States.
However, this analysis absent the lens through which to assess the context of the situation and
the adversary surely would err. That lens is strategic culture (SC). In this section, I will first
discuss why it is so critical to engage strategic culture. Concurrently, I will define strategic
culture and provide a framework to better reference and catalog relevant aspects of Chinese
culture. After this initial stage-setter, this section will provide an in depth depiction of Chinese
SC, and analyze briefly how it may be relevant to U.S. strategy formulation.

Why Strategic Culture
The issue of projecting American security ideals and trends upon our adversaries
continues in current international defense relations. Dartmouth associate professor and Harvard
Reischauer Institute faculty associate, Jennifer Lind; and her colleague Daryl Press, Dartmouth
associate professor and DoD consultant, claim that the greatest danger to present international
relations is the US belief that its current policies are benign. It appears to the authors that no one
in Western national strategic policymaking is willing or able to try to see things as China would
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see them.110 The underlying urgency and frustration in the above suggests not so much that the
U.S. is incorrect in its assumptions. However, the U.S. interpretation of its actions in
international relations, while important, is largely irrelevant for effective deterrence. If the U.S.
seeks to deter Chinese form thinking or doing something, they must know how the Chinese
think, and what responses certain thoughts illicit. The useful fearmongering to shock an aging
strategic architecture into action and Western political commentary is largely devoid of a
thorough and useful investigation into understanding the Chinese beyond a threat assessment.
“The goal is not to sound the alarm over the new salience of nuclear weapons in Russian doctrine
or over the nuclear buildup in China… [but] to understand how nuclear weapons are
contemplated by other actors at a time when we ourselves tend to dismiss them.”111 The United
States is not only avoiding the centrality of nuclear and strategic weapons in policy, they are
often ignoring a critical requirement for developing that policy.
The implications for truncated nuclear deterrence are grave. In essence, deterrence is a
series of existential threats and coercion. These stakes demand as much accuracy as possible
when navigating a conflict or potential conflict. When communicating threats of force, if the
U.S. lacks proficiency in the correct language, they risk making the wrong statement. For
example, “If one’s deterrence threats are considered ‘irrational’ by the targeted society, they may
not be considered credible... They may not even be considered threats, or they may be considered
challenges to be confronted, thus having the exact opposite effect of that desired.”112 During
much of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s the United States’ chief political actors and lawmakers
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were certain that nuclear war planning of cross-domain counterforce targets with scalable
collateral damage - was irrational and unnecessary. The U.S. military did partially prepare for
multiple nuclear scenarios. However, U.S. policy adhered largely to an assured second strike,
minimal nuclear war-fighting methodology. If it had not been for documents like NSDM 242 and
PD-59 in the 1970s, our loss of relative nuclear superiority could have caught us unprepared to
deter.
Strategic culture does not produce cultural prejudice similar to WWII-esque sociological
and anthropological notions of the adversary. “Strategic culture may be, to some a theory… I
propose we think of strategic culture as a research program, one in which certain topics would
seem natural objects of our curiosity.”113 SC provides a lens through which to examine a scenario
or an equation into which to plug data in order to draw the most informed conclusion. In this
way, SC also does not provide exact predictions. It gives decision makers insight and
probabilistic models much like finished intelligence. Former Department of State senior advisor
and SC expert Kerry Kartchner claims, “SC should be used as a supplement to realism and
constructivism... even as a predictor and explainer in certain circumstances where realpolitik
fails to provide a complete or accurate depiction of either."114 Essentially, deterrence is
dependent on hard power dynamics. Despite what is known to be true regarding coercive force,
the conveyance of what may be unknown in the way of materiel; and particularly the unknown
preferences and courses of action of another state must “properly” resonate within the SC of
another actor. This cannot happen without detailed analysis of that culture. The definition of SC
this paper will use is:
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Strategic culture is that set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior,
derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and
written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and
which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives.115
The below discussion will subdivide SC into identity, values/symbols, norms, and perceptual
lens. Identity is the state’s collective characterization of self. Values are symbols, past-times, and
traditional collective roles that are elevated to a common import with a prescribed pattern of
behavior – not necessarily political in nature. Norms depict how identity and values translate into
political patterns of behavior. Perceptual lens qualifies how a culture or state views its political
role, its adversaries, and conflict.116 I believe this methodology generally to cover all necessary
insights into applicable cultural dynamics. These focus areas are interrelated and as such their
implications reinforce one another.
The most famous name in U.S. nuclear deterrence, “Thomas Schelling defines deterrence
as ‘influencing the choices that another party will make, and doing it by influencing his
expectations of how we will behave’.”117 Enacting this central principal of deterrence without
actually studying expectation formulation and communication dynamics is illogical.

Identity
Historically, China perceived itself as the “middle kingdom” whereby all other states
(particularly in its region) were to form concentric circles of vassal tribute like contour lines on a
map.118 This concept still resonates amongst many Chinese elite. Those who subscribe to this
concept of the Chinese state interpret their expanding military, economic, and diplomatic clout as
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manifestations for the realization of this collective identifier and mission.119 Much like 20th
century imperial Japan, any identification or status of China as less than central is conditional
and likely will not satisfy the desires of Chinese elite. Polls conducted by Taiwanese academics
show that 60% of the population strongly support the CCP, 80% at least mostly support the CCP
and are proud to be Chinese.120 This indicates that the Chinese people do in fact see themselves
largely as subjects of a legitimate communist party and a single people with the common history
of the middle kingdom. The Chinese people view themselves as peace loving and harmonious.121
However, there seems to be an almost Confucian hierarchy within this construct. Peace and
harmony are not synonymous with equality, but a society of proper order. Their identity as a
harmonious people would likely require deference over seeking agreeability, in diplomacy.
Many Chinese elites view their state as a stirring gentle giant, emerging from
incapacitation. Throughout Western exploitation, China remained “ethically advanced” when
compared to its captors.122 From this formulation, the Chinese conceive their identity as less
offensively violent and less materialistic. The Chinese view themselves and their actions as
defensive, largely based on this historical trauma of the state identity. China’s past codifies a
rebellion against the harmful external images of China’s identity; and would likely make elite
sensitive to being treated “less than” by the West. This may also manifest itself in suspicion of
Western action as almost neo-colonialist or occidental. An example of this is the assumed
purposeful disenfranchisement of the Chinese from global liberal institutions.

119. Jared McKinney, (November 11, 2019).
120. Military and Security Developments, i.
121. Manjari Chatterjee Miller, “China, India, and Their Differing Conceptions of International Order,” in The
China-India Rivalry in the Globalization Era, ed. by T.V. Paul (Telangana, India: Orient BlackSwan, 2019),
85.
122. Andrew Scobell, “Himalayan Standoff: Strategic Culture and the China-India Rivalry,” in The China-India
Rivalry in the Globalization Era, ed. by T.V. Paul (Telangana, India: Orient BlackSwan, 2019), 171.

58

The keepers of this culture are political elite, military brass, and academic strategists
brought together by the CCP in an orchestrated cultural reawakening.123 The CCP understand
their central role to maintain a unified national identity. Any challenge to this identity, such as
the Taiwanese or Muslims in the western regions, would challenge what it means to be Chinese.
The CCP deems collective identity as too costly for experimentation.
China views itself as modernized, sagely, and benevolent. The CCP clings to these
historic cultural characteristics to maintain legitimacy.124 Again, because the Chinese see
themselves as wise relative to others, external perceptions of controversy would not outweigh the
internal essence of right purpose. Moreover, the Chinese elite may find it of critical import to
claim some sort of gain from diplomatic interactions. Claiming victory will add to the legitimacy
of the leadership by aligning them with tradition conceptions of Chinese wisdom. The Chinese
must be the shrewd navigators of international dynamics.
Anti-traditionalism seeks to supplement nativist tendencies with best practices or lessons
learned from modernized foreign societies.125 The sage wisdom allows for party adjustments to
traditionalism in the name of advancement. Moreover, this delicate navigation belongs to the
elite and seems to serve as a partial justification for party rule. Therefore, there is a great impetus
on advancing technology and economic growth associated with legitimacy. The Chinese
government is imbued with the mandate of heaven.126 It has a divine right as part of its identity.
This makes challenges to its dominion particularly offensive. Furthermore, any net loss in major
diplomatic matters may signal a loss of heaven’s mandate for the ruling party. This loss could
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manifest as a simple public challenge to the CCP. These historical concepts and narratives form
the identity and justification for the party in the absence of legitimacy derived from an electorate.
Additionally, China draws on such a long and storied history that its SC naturally compiles
elements that seem contradictory into a single narrative vein that explains away temporary
weaknesses and suggests the permanence of the powerful Chinese people. Being insensitive to
such a delicate concept could allow U.S. policy makers to overlook a potential cultural trigger
for force, or to give too much credence to pacifist claims.

Values/Symbols
China values its military tradition of strategy - most prominently displayed during the
Ming Dynasty or from authors such as Sun Tzu. Furthermore, traditional realist conceptions of
strength resonate with Chinese strategy.127 Its rich strategic memory provides a patience in policy
that may confound most Western, particularly American actors. This is deeply intertwined with
Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. Confucian thought caries the power of millennia of
influence and emphasizes harmony over conflict, as well as prosperity and righteousness. Sun
Tzu, who was influenced by Confucian thought, suggested that winning through non-violent
strategy was the most preferred and sophisticated victory.128 The spiritual and truth-seeking
meditative dynamics of Taoism and Buddhism traditions may make the Chinese more cautious to
exact an immediate reaction or to respond publicly. Seeking harmony and righteousness also
provides a potential mode of legitimizing governmental actions.
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The Chinese value virtue and specifically truth in their prosperous leadership, which
supports their focus on defense, a noble pursuit, over the frivolity of offensive operations.129
These subjective qualities require a strong narrative to justify them. A major component of that
narrative will be the relative success of political actions during which virtue can be on display.
This is likely to increase the significance of failure or a slight to that consistent with a religious
conflict or edict. The focus on prosperity and non-violent victory provides competitors with a
potential avenue to exact a well-calculated deterrence that maintains a mutually beneficial quid
pro quo. As long as a competitor is not directly inflammatory, or if they are willing to make
some concessions, avoiding conflict may be desirable but also critical for an appearance of
legitimacy. Sun Tzu and the Great Wall stand as Chinese symbols of potent pacifism for the
ever-present emphasis on defense. Unfortunately, these symbols of defense serve to justify most
Chinse actions as defensive and so comparatively “good”.130 Therefore, condemning Chinese
military forays into new areas as provocative may not make much sense to the Chinese body
politick. Furthermore, sanctions based upon provocations, if not delicately maneuvered will only
justify the concept of foreign aggression and the symbol of the defensive CCP. Competitors may
better seek inconspicuous counter efforts, and only condemn the most egregious acts to prevent
resonance of this narrative.
The Chinese value pragmatism and economic growth because they are paths to global
power status. Furthermore, China should pursue whatever path achieves this status.131
Ultimately, growth at all costs supports a realpolitik policy with key traditional sensitivities that
can act as triggers.132 Status in this context is essentially a reworking of the middle kingdom
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concept. Pragmatism and returning to a historically rightly ordered world justifies compromises
of traditionalism, adding some institutionalized unpredictability to Chinese policy. However, the
emphasis on economic growth or modernization may be an avenue if a competitor’s policy must
move against a traditionally Chinse concept or value.
Another manifestation of China valuing distinctly Chinese harmonious leadership is its
view of international institutions. China belongs to many international institutions or great power
clubs. However, the more its influence increases, the more it develops its own institutions.133
China values international cooperation and common development, but the value of traditional
concepts of power or control matter more. The proper name for the Chinese value of harmony is
tianxia, conceptualized by Hu Jintao as the harmonious world or Xi Jinping as the China
dream.134 There exists a genuine component and desire for peace, and stability within tianxia.
Tianxia provides hope to competitors that at the core of Chinese international relations is a value
for coexistence and cooperation. However, China also seeks to export this concept as a soft
power concept to make Chinese rule more attractive.135 The lack of trust inherent in realpolitik
drives China to desire security and harmony. Therefore, Chinese peace supplants peace imposed
by a non-righteous and perhaps violent outsider. Nonetheless, there is an opportunity for the
efficacy of deterrence particularly in a period of parity – as long as some affront to cultural
sensitivities do not make the Chinese feel insecure. If this happens, they may well seek their
harmony through expanded strength and security.
Domestic political stability is a critically important value. This sets the conditions for
modernization, stability, and maintaining governmental legitimacy. At times, Chinese political
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elite assuaged nationalists with rhetoric and actions necessary to maintain order. However,
international policy often remains more calculated and pragmatic.136 Essentially, the Chinese are
willing to say and do seemingly (to a Western observer) rash things to stabilize the domestic
environment. While this may worry the foreign observer, Chinese elite understand that they are
operating in different environments. China’s strict valuing of sovereignty helps demarcate broad
permissibility to maintain stability in domestic affairs. This suggests a sustainable efficacy of
deterrence despite the Western perception of implications from a domestic crack down.

Norms
Historically, China used force to pacify disagreements in critical areas, yet sought to
settle disputes along its periphery.137 This has tremendous implications for U.S. Chinse security
policy. If the U.S. identifies critical points of contention such as Taiwan and the 12 nautical
miles off its coast, they can likely settle or stabilize other major disputes in their favor. (Disputes
for reference include the nine dashed line dispute in the South China Sea, or the East China Sea
island nationalization dispute.) Strategic deterrence could be a victory won from ceasing arms
sales to Taiwan or limiting provocative U.S. naval patrols.
China’s “virtuocratic” culture may make it seem more irascible in international
encounters relative to other actors.138 To reiterate, an elite culture founded on virtue carries the
normative implication of pursuing rightness or success at all costs. The pursuit or even
demonstration of rightness seems to invigorate what is a millennia-old emphasis on offensive

136. Kenneth Johnson, “China's Strategic Culture”, 7-9.
137. T. V. Paul, The China-India Rivalry, 12.
138. Christopher Ford, “Behind the Official Narrative”.

63

strategies over static defense and an efficacious view of violent conflict resolution.139
Furthermore, the conceptual interaction between operative realpolitik and Confucian-idealized
discourse offers a normative justification of coercive measures. This dynamic predisposes China
to the unquestioned justification for the use of force compared to other states, particularly within
its region.140 The justification of force under the guise of defense is akin to an offensive crusade
to defend the holy land. While this is admittedly sensationalist, the key takeaway is that the
opportunity for rapid escalation is a serious concern when competing with China. Further
complicating matters, there is somewhat of a disconnect between the PLA and the CCP
leadership due to the relative operational autonomy of the PLA.141Therefore, passive Chinese
strategic policy may still quickly escalate under the nascent strategic constructs and civilian
leadership to military integration controls mentioned in previous sections.
China increasingly abandons non-provocative postures, exacting its self-interest, despite
official propaganda.142 The norm here is really the hierarchy of power relative to softer measures.
China uses cultural propaganda to justify typical great power actions without seeming like the
Western targets of animosity. A long-standing Chinese norm is to interpret security policy
through the lens of historic Chinese cultural maxims and concepts.143 This practice may mean
that China is not always even aware when divergent policy and actions smell of contradiction or
seem to be propaganda. An example is Chinese culture as normatively defensive – as described
above. This characterization rests upon the concept of Chinese permanence or the staying power
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of its people, prominence, and some form of government.144 The Chinese see this prolonged
existential normalcy as a sort of manifest destiny they must defend. Somewhat ironically,
instigating violence in the name of defense seems contrary to Chinese policy documents based
on Western interpretations. However, to the Chinese, their actions do not warrant judgement
from the West, which further complicates Chinese – U.S. relations.
Shaping international policy and seeking uniquely Chinese avenues to do so is becoming
a normal practice.145 This nests within the Chinese increased pursuit for global leadership.
However, this does not always put China in the contrarian role as Western sources oft accuse. In
fact, China actually complies with Western-based international rules and often behaves like a
status-quo power. Assertive or hardline discourses exist alongside political elite with moderate
opinions.146 It is a Western misperception that China purely seeks systemic revision or a violent
reordering of interest. That very publicly stated supposition is probably the fastest way to
impinge on a Chinese environment where normal is some sort of open debate regarding strategy.
The Chinese obtain status through dominance and prestige. Dominance signifies hard
power; prestige signifies influence. There remains a trend consistent with historical practices to
maintain both measures of power in a delicate balance. Today, the Chinese regime is focusing on
soft power more than ever before.147 This provides a unique window to pander to the less
harmful of the two power vehicles. The U.S. could recognize Chinese status as an equal of sorts
to the United States, and treat it accordingly. This could all occur without any major concessions
in the realm of hard power, zero-sum domination. Evidence of this concept rests with the history
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of China-Vietnam relations. For hundreds of years, China and Vietnam enjoyed stable relations
and respect for the territorial interests of the other. Vietnam accomplished this through a
normative practice (at the time) known as kowtowing. The Vietnamese emissary bowed before
the Chinese emperor, recognizing his prestige and superiority symbolically. The dispute settled
as a compromise in Vietnam’s favor, and up until South China Sea tensions recently, normalized
stability between the two actors based on regular recognition of the Chinese self-image.
Additionally, prior to the Opium Wars, the British emissary bowed before the emperor
symbolically recognizing his prestige. This calmed initial tensions enough for the British to
unfortunately take great advantage of the Chinese people for mercantilist gain. There exists a
precedent for prestige-based placation of the Chinese. This precedent could prove valuable when
developing U.S. nuclear strategy.
Perceptual Lens
China’s frame of reference is a continuous and ancient narrative where China is the
benevolent leader, pacifying a violent world. This lens allots a considerable amount of strategic
patience to China.148 China need not rush to accomplish its objectives. With a history that spans
thousands of years, it can allow others to act full hardy while it bides its time and pursues longterm goals – the two Centenary Goals for instance. “Pacifying” is more akin to the Pax Romana,
as keepers of the peace with a hegemonic monopoly on violence.
In the sections regarding identity and value, I discussed the importance for CCP
legitimacy and maintaining control over China’s people. China’s elite consider the reunification
of Taiwan as a top priority. Due to the recent arms sales to Taiwan, the United States is a direct
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enemy of a cause for which one third of the Chinese military prepares. Moreover, the “Spheres
of Influence” foreign occupation compounds the animosity towards an external great power
medaling in China’s historic land. Furthermore, China views this type of conflict as typical in
global politics, or through a realist lens. China “knows” it cannot become comfortable in
positions of power, and must prepare for challenges to its sovereignty.149 In previous sections, I
discussed the four primary investors to ASEAN being the EU, Japan, the U.S and China.
Undoubtedly, the Western and Japanese economic influence within ASEAN is reminiscent of
past Chinese humiliation. This historically founded lack of trust for outsiders likely drives the
impetus for increased regional economic control. China views non-Chinese powers through
insecurity. Publically instigating a major political sensitivity, such as Taiwan, marks the U.S. as
a target for Chinese defense preparation. The U.S. should work to diminish inflammatory acts
regionally, as much as possible. The challenge is decreasing animosity without ceding strategic
advantage.
China sees the geopolitics trapped in a Cold War mentality of zero-sum games, and
wishes to lead the world into a period of cooperation – to “forge a new security path”. Chinese
rhetoric suggests they are a peace-loving and non-expansionist minded people – a “stirring gentle
giant”.150 China sees themselves as a unifying force within the world. The Chinese elite see their
nation as a world leader. Competitors should take cautious note of the self-classification as
stirring. China intends to lead completely in a regional capacity and lead even globally to some
degree. The aforementioned rhetoric suggests increased frustration with the world, growing
concurrently with Chinese power. China’s global outlook may no longer singularly focus on a
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tianxia type hierarchy with China at its core. China does recognize the need to operate within the
international order, with peer nations. However, as Chinese power increases, their emphasis on
more traditional concepts of China-centric order are likely to return.151 Moreover, as Chinese
power increases, so does enmity for the U.S. In fact, while more than half of the Chinese
population has a favorable view of America, they also see the U.S. as a top threat. Furthermore,
the U.S.-backed international order benefits Washington “disproportionately”.152 Widespread
party support and an historical victim mentality allows China to criticize the U.S. while striving
to reach parity with it. To the Chinese, the international order comprises of vestiges of Western
power. The Chinese believe that the U.S. seeks to contain China and is adopting an ever moreconfrontational approach towards them. All U.S. diplomacy and strategy filters through the
claims of containment.153 If the United States can pause negative rhetoric geared towards China,
or forestall sanctions, it may be able to assuage Chinese fears of strategic encirclement.
Lessening fear could allow more moderate elite within China to stem traditionalist or nationalist
views for imposing Chinese power. The ensuing diminished tensions would allow the U.S. time
to strategize or implement new strategy absent targeted Chinese animosity.
President Xi Jinping characterized the international order as transitioning to a multi-polar
system of deepened economic integration. China wishes to accelerate this transition for its
continued gain.154 The Chinese worldview is a system increasingly tied to the Chinese economy.
This system is also transitioning to allow for greater Chinese influence. These conditions likely
emboldened China to assert its Centenary Goals and to begin implementing initiatives like RCEP
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and BRI. With this type of perception of the international order and Chinese freedom to operate
therein, the U.S. must assume that strategic advancements will only continue. Continued
advancements would lessen U.S. deterrent efficacy. The U.S. must work to challenge this
perception, while also adjusting its strategy to operate within the current perceived reality.
China is mirroring its force around a U.S. triad-based system. It is pursuing deeper civilsector to military integration, similar to that of the U.S., to better leverage technological
innovation in the civilian sector. Its hypersonic weapons will reportedly skirt the lines of our
missile defense – a system China believes would deter them after a pre-emptive U.S.
counterforce strike. China’s nuclear posture points towards the United States. The U.S. must
prepare accordingly. Currently China fields an assured retaliation posture with mega-ton
thermonuclear counter value targeting.155 However, the purpose of Chinese strategic forces is
adapting to coincide with the shift in strategic force research and engineering capability. This
suggests that China’s current nuclear posture does not reflect their nuclear goals. Their
overarching goal of being a world-class super-power by 2049 most likely also includes a
strategic deterrent or capability element. This should provide the U.S, policy maker and
legislator with a true vigor to execute force advancement and comprehensive strategy
revitalization.

Chinese Strategic Culture Overarching Themes and Conclusions
From the above four sections there are a few overarching themes and implications worth
reviewing. First, a portion of each section added nuance and depth to what political theorists
would characterize as a face-based society. Perception and deference at all levels matter
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immensely to China. Second, the U.S. is the focal point of Chinese strategic modeling and
animosity. Nuclear/strategic pursuits are likely a critical component of ensuring Chinese designs
on an expanded international role. Moreover, China recognizes the U.S. as an obstacle. Next,
concessions short of strategic appeasement could have real results for attenuating tensions in
favor of the U.S. Conversely, strategic appeasement could greatly weaken the U.S. position.
However, status recognition and compromise may achieve beneficial results. Another point to
note is that realpolitik underscores all of Chinese SC. You cannot seriously engage Chinese SC
without acknowledging the motivations of power and mistrust. Next, Chinese ambitions cannot
be stayed until they dissipate. China’s historic view of self-importance; coupled with what will
soon be the largest global economy cast a foreboding shadow across its competitor’s interests. A
sixth conclusion is that there may be an opportunity to undermine CCP legitimacy by publically
moderating the U.S. stance on China, while provoking China on peripheral issues - with a preeminent deterrent and strategy. This interaction would exploit their contradictory altruism and
xenophobia to coalesce a coalition to support the U.S. Lastly, a plan seeking direct confrontation
with or humiliation of China could easily escalate to warfare.
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AN EXERCISE IN SPECULATION AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Setting the Conditions for Speculation
China’s economy will soon overtake that of the U.S. as the world’s largest. More
importantly, the U.S. strategic elite clearly do not believe that China’s global interests align with
U.S. interests. This perception makes China the greatest threat to American strategy objectives.
The U.S. defense and diplomatic missions currently respond to the growing Chinese threat with
aggressive rhetoric and system shocking investments pursuant to pre-eminent technologies.
While such a reaction is likely necessary to rejuvenate strategic capabilities, truncating American
strategy at technological pursuits will find America unprepared for the future. Below the
threshold of conflict, strategic systems provide deterrence and shape much of the security
dynamic in great power competition. The U.S. requires a revitalization of the complex and
ubiquitous nuclear and strategic policy formulation from the Cold War.
The time is ripe for the United States to redevelop strategy and begin preparing for the
growing Chinese defense paradigm. In force posture and capability, the U.S. still has strategic
pre-eminence and likely will for the next decade. Certainly, Chinese development programs in
strategic systems, policy statements, and pursuits in enabling domains all suggest that this
window of superiority will close quickly. The imperative for immediate planning preparation
falls to the U.S. defense and diplomatic community.
Moreover, the economic disposition of China will soon seat it as the world’s largest
economy. However, China faces some significant structural and demographic challenges to its
economy before it can begin functioning as an efficient high-income economy. These challenges
pull much of the Chinse political focus toward inward development strategies. This period of
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internal reform further shifts focus from what could be U.S. strategic preparation to handle the
growing interests of China. However, U.S. ability to maintain pre-eminence predicates upon its
ability for continued U.S. economic growth.
The call for in depth nuclear policy led to an assessment of the last great period of
strategic weapons system competition. The tradition of high-level strategic thought and scenariobased analysis and preparation during the Cold War proved to be of great utility to the U.S. great
power strategy of the time. This analysis also seems that it would have some applicability to the
current great power competition between the U.S. and China. Some weaknesses of Cold War
strategy included the mirror imaging of American cultural analysis upon our adversaries. This
discussion seeks to overcome the short falls of Cold War strategic analysis by advocating for an
assessment of Chinese strategic culture to go part in parcel with nuclear posture analysis. The
analysis of Chinese culture provides a roadmap that we will apply to recommended U.S. actions
and preparations for the future. U.S. policy makers should take elements from this analysis and
conduct a much broader analysis of their own to ensure that U.S. investment and actions obtain
the greatest degree of efficacy.
Below, I will project a scenario-driven analysis for U.S. strategy vis a vis China. To be
clear, this is simply a speculative exercise, designed to show the utility of such a model. The U.S.
will require much more in-depth and intelligence-informed modeling. Nonetheless, the modeling
will combine cultural analysis with a logical progression of economies and force posture to
develop policy recommendations for the United States. This exercise will suggest the level of
preparation and the type of thought the immediate strategic situation requires. Prior to this
exercise, I will discuss scenario-driven analysis revolving around periods of development, and
why they provide unique utility in this instance.
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Why Periods
The fourth section engaged the utility of periods specifically as part of the broader
strategic outlook of the Cold War. This is not the only method of modeling that could prove
useful to U.S. strategizing. However, it has merits that make it effective and the targeted
recommendation for this paper. Having a time-bound phased approach for scaling and tailoring
force posture can serve as a predictive modeling tool. More importantly, it can serve as an
intellectual tool to posit possible developments and begin to plan for potential scenarios. The
exercise is not necessarily about getting every facet of the future correct. Having an architecture
to apply actual developments against allows for an educated interpretation of events, and the
quick pivoting of programs, as necessary. For instance, perhaps we predict the Chinese will have
widely deployed batteries of hypersonic glide vehicles in three regions in five years. From this
assessment, the U.S. plans for rudimentary defenses in place in three years, their own offensive
hypersonic system in six, and pluses up regional security in the projected areas of deployment.
The Chinese may have the system in place in three years, in different locations than posited.
Moreover, the maneuverability of the glide vehicles may render some of the defenses useless.
However, adjusted regionally based deterrence strategies through conventional and nuclear
forces would still be applicable with minor adjustments. The defense systems would provide a
platform upon which to build greater and more applicable capability. The timeline may have
been incorrect, but forecasting future actions shortens the potential capability gap. Simply
developing hypersonic weapons of our own without the broader architecture provided by timebound in depth modeling would likely find the U.S. far more unprepared.
The memorandum Mr. Brzezinski drafted for President Carter is evidence of this
phenomena. The memo provides an explanation of various iterations of enemy driven analysis
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driving phases of force posture. The document shows an understanding that different phases of
relative capability necessitate different levels of response.156 As relative capabilities began to
change so did the strategy. The U.S. forces continued to deter the Soviet forces. The grappling
with the particulars of force development allowed the U.S. to notice small but significant
inaccuracies in our predictions quickly, and adjust as necessary. As nuclear parity approached,
the U.S. believed the Soviets would stop their buildup at near U.S. force levels. When they did
not and when they introduced new qualitative capabilities, the previous doctrine lost much of its
relevance. To revise our doctrine then became a critical although unpopular task in the face of
the continuing Soviet buildup during the 1970s. Brzezinski dictates to the President “You have
accomplished this through a number of directives which put much more emphasis on objective
capabilities to reinforce the psychological and subjective aspects of deterrence.”157 A series of
calculated steps and analysis prepared the way for pivoting the nuclear force. The milieu set by
living within the mindset of thorough preparation made the finer components of advanced policy
and technology easily conveyable to the highest levels of leadership to attain appropriate policy
responses. How much more prepared will the U.S. be for the Chinese threat with the return of
sophisticated nuclear culture? Moreover, applying Chinese cultural assessments to strategy
projections will help prevent the U.S. force deficiencies that arose in the 1970s from assuming
that the Soviets would only pursue an exact mirror image of our forces. Hopefully, the
reassertion of strategic modeling will allow for the return of strategic policy proficiency and the
corresponding flexible preparedness of the past.
A passive approach to the rising Chinese strategic threat will likely prove insufficient,
“What China does with its military and nuclear power in the future will be determined without
156. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Carter Transformation.
157. Ibid.
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the influence of countervailing institutions … the emerging cool war with China deserves the
utmost attention in this respect.”158 Maintaining the relative cultural taboo within the U.S. of
crisis mitigation and diminishing the reliance on strategic forces will not prepare the U.S. for the
next great power competition. The normative forces of the international community will not
affect the pursuit of Chinese goals. Pursuant to reaching their Centenary goals, China is investing
in RCEPs, the BRI, BRICS bank, and other such endeavors. The growth of China’s strategic
capabilities require a proactive U.S. policy response. Modeling Chinese specific interests,
developments, and decision dynamics will provide the requisite kind of proactivity.
China is pursuing a hedging strategy that aims at minimizing strategic risks, increasing
freedom of action, diversifying strategic options, and shaping U.S. preferences and choices.159
Chinese policy is extremely proactive regarding diminishing the interests of its greatest
competitor. They are attempting to increase their influence in international institutions, create
their own institutions, and develop a nuclear triad while designing unconventional weapon
systems. Dong Wang suggests above all China recognizes the imperative for a comprehensive
strategy in great power competition. China is assessing U.S. strategic culture, policy, and
capabilities to achieve their regional objectives across the next three decades (2049 is the target
of their second Centenary goal). The U.S. cannot afford a passive approach to strategic risks and
coercion when their primary competitor actively partakes in this type of analysis.
If the U.S. enters a nuclear contest with the Chinese, devoid of complex strategy and
preparation, they will be out-maneuvered. Further passivity or even appeasement in East Asia in
the face of Chinese complex strategy will only diminish the role of the U.S. A combative
approach that refuses any reasonable concessions or reduction of resources in one area so that the
158. Thérèse Delpech, Nuclear Deterrence, 162-163.
159. Dong Wang, “Is China Trying to Push the U.S. out of East Asia?,” pp. 59-84.
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U.S. might flex them to a better course of action, is untenable. This practice will lead to war
when China crosses one of a dozen “red-lines”. Or, this practice will cause the U.S. to spend
itself into bankruptcy as it attempts to out-produce and out-design the Chinese in every facet of
their strategic arsenal. War is probable with China not because of reductionist great power
transition theories. War is likely because we are careening down more broad academically viable
paths to war. This is due to the self-fulfilling momentum of realism.160 The U.S. and China are
sovereign states that do not trust each other. They are competing for power and security
regionally and globally. At the moment, the rhetoric of U.S. political leaders makes all Chinese
actions a transgression against our national security and a call to arms. Many of our regional
actions fail to take into account the way China will perceive them, and often seem more
inflammatory than necessary.
China attaining all of its historic claims on regional hegemony ignores the status quo of
U.S. and Western regional interests. The U.S. desire to retain the status quo of the last 30 years
of absolute pre-eminence and as the primary arbiter of regional matters is equally unrealistic.
The status quo is approaching a catastrophic war. The strategic modeling attempted below could
both help to relieve the political tension between the U.S. and China while simultaneously
preparing the U.S. once again for the potential of great power conflict.

160. John A. Vasquez, “Whether and How Global Leadership Transitions Will Result in War: Some Long-Term
Predictions from the Steps-to-War Explanation,” Systemic Transitions, 2009, pp. 131-160,
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230618381_7.
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Addressing Alternate Viewpoints
This paper’s assertion does not exist within a bi-polar world, but a multi-polar
international order. Discussing the dynamic of strategic weapon systems amongst only two
nations may be a narrow perspective to take.
This is true in the first place among the major powers, particularly the United
States, Russia, and China, since one cannot exclude the possibility of a conflict
involving any two or all three of them. Managing a triangular nuclear situation
would be far more difficult than stabilizing a bipolar one. What, for example,
would be the nature of any delicate balance of terror” among three parties?161
Discussing the strategic dynamic in Asia and certainly should include Russia, and easily could
include India – the second largest nation with one of the fastest growing economies in Asia.
Japan, should it feel particular under threat from China could increase its defense spending from
somewhere around 2% to 10%. This Japanese war state would certainly complicate matters for
the Chinese and change regional dynamics. A complete analytical framework requires further
research along these lines, particularly how other nations will alter the nuclear relationship
between China and the U.S. This extensive vein of analysis is far beyond the scope of this paper
and perhaps any single work. Despite the added complexities, the limiting of this conversation to
China and the U.S. does not diminish its relevance. Russia is not going to surpass or even come
close to the United States in economic output any time soon. Their lack of global economic
leadership will likely leave them as a critical regional actor, and a global strategic agitator, but
not as a global rival of the United States on the scale of the Soviet Union, or of China, presently.
Japan in most scenarios will fall within U.S. policy and strategy. To a lesser degree, India will
likely align with the U.S. more closely than China. Even so, India’s economic growth remains
uncertain, and domestic and regional ethnic tensions abound. Taken together these dynamics

161. Thérèse Delpech, Nuclear Deterrence, 20, 37.
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leave India external to this somewhat bi-lateral conversation regarding shrinking U.S. strategic
interests. However, the United States would do well to keep India close, as a regional
counterweight to China politically and hopefully economically.
For two primary reasons, the exclusion of these and other states does not diminish the
relevance of our conversation. First, the two largest militaries, economies, and soon to be
strategic forces belong to the United States and China. They are the two most powerful countries
in the world and within the new great power completion. Neither is likely to quickly lose
international position based on domestic issues. Second, the inclusion of these actors and how
they will enhance or harm U.S. security considerations, should and likely will be part of the
strategizing posited here. They just remain largely within the political poles of the China and
U.S. rivalry.
Strategic Periods from a U.S. Perspective
Below is a description of three sample periods projecting U.S. and China strategic
interaction. Surely further analysis could lengthen, shorten, or even combine some of this
assessment. However, I stopped at the implications of the third due to the increasing speculative
nature of each section and further assessment likely requiring classified material to make viable
assertions. The analysis covers characteristics with a few caveats provided; economic,
diplomatic, and research and engineering implications, and supposed Chinese actions melded
with an interjection of the conclusions from the assessment of Chinese strategic culture.
Period 1. U.S. Superiority: Chinese Preoccupation and Nascence. Depending on the
ability of the Chinese economy to overcome its internal challenges and the pace of advancement
of its nuclear force, the first period will last between 5 and 10 years. This means that starting in
2020, this period could last until 2025 or 2030.
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Characteristics. The U.S. maintains complete strategic superiority, enough to neutralize
the Chinese nuclear/strategic threat. The U.S. maintains a high degree of damage limitation
levels to prevent significant follow on effect and actions. Chinese force neutralization, target
hardening and dispersal, and missile defense all help to limit damage. The U.S. maintains global,
and more relevantly, regional conventional superiority. This force superiority serves as a
supplement or condition setter for strategic-like weapon effects and deterrence. The U.S. also
maintains superiority in cyber and space domain enablers discussed above. This is a period of
U.S. opportunity and nuclear revitalization, and Chinese development and internal focus.
However, the U.S. nuclear architecture is “aged” with dire need for revitalization. They
must maintain the research and engineering imperatives discussed in the 2001 and 2018 NPRs
regarding revitalizing nuclear support architecture, nuclear proficiency within the military, and
nuclear weapon systems. Without leveraging this period of opportunity to develop and plan for a
future competing with a more capable China, this could be the last period where the U.S. has a
prominent voice in determining its East Asian agenda. Without maintaining a strategic deterrent
and supporting policy, the U.S. will not easily impose its will so far from its shores.
Economic Implications. The U.S. economy remains larger than the Chinese economy. This
statistic helps fuel advanced development projects and calculated force posture increases and
preparations. The Chinese economy is combating the hardship of overcoming the so-called
middle-income trap with its own brand of unique demographics. While Chinese growth slows, it
still exceeds that of the U.S.
Current Chinese military spending is reported around 2%. Experts suspect this is closer to
3%.162 While this statistic can be misleading because their 6% annual economic growth does not

162. Jared McKinney, (Lecture, Washington DC, August 26, 2019).

79

make this a static number, nonetheless, it represents the lack of Chinese preparation for a
conventional conflict with the United States. Most economies preparing for the eventuality of
war spend upwards of 5% on defense. Moreover, conquest-bent war-states spend closer to 10%.
The above suggests the viability and high probability of success for a swift U.S. led or backed
military operation during this period.
Diplomatic Implications. The U.S. should coalesce as much regional support as possible
while it still has a big enough relative economic stick to pull influence from China. Partnerships
with India or RCEP nations may help the U.S. benefit from future Asian-Pacific economic
growth and initiatives. This could prevent the U.S. economy from dramatically trailing the Asian
economic leader in the region that does the most business, globally. The U.S. should also take
this time to impose joint force advancements or development projects and lasting security
agreements. Strategically, the U.S. retains the greatest coercive force. Leveraging this for future
strength while China is somewhat otherwise occupied, is essential for keeping at least part of the
region aligned with the U.S. In the future, when the U.S. has relatively less to offer, agreements
may be more difficult to levy. During this period, it is unlikely that China could construct its own
alliance system to rival that of the U.S. based on its negative world image and lack of established
far-reaching alliances.163 The U.S. should therefore seek to leverage its alliance network while
deepening it to ensure longevity. The United States should also cool tensions with China by
moderating its rhetoric, and halting provocative presence patrols. (Particularly the U.S. should
halt the patrols within 12 nautical miles of Chinese territory; as well as those through the Taiwan
Strait). Despite their intentions, we now know that the Chinese will not be able to ignore such
provocations. These actions will only cement tensions and animosity towards the U.S. The U.S.

163. Dong Wang, “Is China Trying to Push the U.S. out of East Asia?,” pp. 59-84.
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should use this period to exhaustively analyze and develop a plan to implement in the next
period. This plan will describe concessions (with strategic implications) they are willing to make
right away to the Chinese. The plan would include concessions they are ultimately willing to
make but that they would prefer to not – and what conditions would lead to such circumstances.
Lastly, the U.S. must decide upon so-called strategic hard lines or areas where if China counters
their interests or ignores their policy, it would warrant certain coercive responses.
Simple rhetoric could go a long way to alleviating costly political animosity. For example,
a lack of discourse has allowed misunderstanding and polarization to be a self-fulfilling prophesy
for realist power dynamics and impending conflict in the East China Sea (ECS).164 Without
moderating their position, the U.S. should attempt to limit the amount of anti-Chinese rhetoric
with regard to the ECS. Political positions have not changed regarding the ECS islets recently.
However, this dispute became one of the most contentious regional issues, largely through
reciprocal inflammatory gestures. Moreover, “Risks of inadvertent and accidental escalation are
further elevated by the absence of substantive nuclear and general defense dialogue.”165 In this
case, the authors are discussing the critical lack of dialogue across the Indo-Pacific regarding
strategic postures. Such absence creates ambiguous policy and skewed interpretation with
potentially tragic results. The United States could still increase power projection assets in the
region to support our allies, but seek informed diplomatic dialogue to diffuse the situation and set
clear boundaries in the pursuit of more stable regional relationships. Recognizing China through
dialogue may help mask the antagonistic nature of force increases. Beijing has explicitly
acknowledged the U.S. predominance in the international system. China to some degree

164. Ryoko Nakano, “The Sino–Japanese Territorial Dispute and Threat Perception in Power Transition,” The
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acknowledges that, for a more peaceful future to emerge in East Asia, the United States and
China, as an incumbent power and a rising power, will have to accommodate each other.166 This
will require negotiations and renegotiations regarding the boundaries of their relative power, as
well as their respective roles in the future regional order. This dialogue must start with simple
status recognition, and calming of anti-Chinese political rhetoric on the part of the U.S.
Research and Engineering Implications. Technological pursuits for the U.S. must revolve
around modernizing the U.S. nuclear force. This modernization should include advanced
delivery systems, as well as quantum computing capabilities (advanced machine learning), and
proactive space domain defense measures. The new systems should be flexible to multiple uses
and regular upgrades, in keeping with the 2018 NPR.
Adversary Actions and Strategic Culture Assessment. China will likely seek to further their
own force modifications in pursuit of greater regional strategic pre-eminence. However, it should
maintain a strong internal investment and focus. Moderating “humiliating language” will help
deter China from combativeness, providing a greater period of opportunity for US strategic
preparations. “A minimalist US approach – one that avoids getting deeply involved in regional
issues where the U.S. has no direct stake – is more likely to promote stability than a maximalist
one that blunders in and hopes to perpetuate US primacy for its own sake”.167 Preparing a more
visibly minimalist and verbally appeasing approach will resonate with the face-based society of
China. This should help to lessen the view of the U.S. as the primary strategic enemy. This is a
good faith step toward future concession to attenuate tensions. Official Chinese policy remains
purposefully ambiguous with a willingness to use force if the U.S. “directly challenges its

166. Dong Wang, “Is China Trying to Push the U.S. out of East Asia?,” pp. 59-84.
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sovereignty” (You 1-21).168 The U.S. must assume that China does not trust Western diplomacy,
and that the image of China as regional leader is not a fleeting conception. Knowing this, the U.S
can assume that China will interpret public maximalist proclamations as violations of and intent
to violate its sovereignty.
Period 2. Transition of Regional Security Influence. Again, depending on when or if the
Chinese overcome their internal economic challenges; and when they fully refocus strategy
toward nuclear posture – this discussion allows for a five-year delta regarding the start of this
period. This places the second period beginning between 2025 and 2030, and ending around
2035.
Characteristics. During this period, China will be transitioning from nascent strategic
forces and posture to a more robust model. Chinese strategic asset survivability and nuclear force
organization competency will greatly increase. This will effectively lower the threshold for
Chinese nuclear posturing and provocation because the potential for grave cost to the U.S. will
increase. Chinese force posture will reduce U.S. damage limitation mechanisms, acting as a
further deterrent against U.S. coercion. U.S. conventional superiority will remain, but to a lesser
degree due to an increase in Chinese power projection assets. The diminished advantage will
further constrain U.S. freedom of maneuver regionally. However, the revitalized U.S. nuclear
architecture and corresponding systems will maintain U.S. nuclear pre-eminence. Joint U.S.
conventional assets and precision guided munitions will still menace Chinese policy-makers.
U.S. space and cyber advantages, barring a major breakthrough in a game changing technology,
will maintain an ever-narrowing advantage. China will remain cautious in the face of a still more

168. Ji You, “Xi Jinping and PLA Centrality in Beijing’s South China Sea Dispute Management,” China: An
International Journal 15, no. 2 (June 2017): pp. 1-21.
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powerful United States; however, they will begin to test the boundaries of that power in
scenarios where they believe they are willing to risk more than the U.S.
If the United States enters [a] … state of mutual nuclear vulnerability with
China—meaning that China can inflict unacceptable damage on U.S. cities, even
in the aftermath of a U.S. first strike—then U.S. policymakers may worry that
U.S. nuclear weapons will be much less likely to deter China from engaging in
conventional or sub-conventional aggression.169
The advancing Chinese strategic deterrent amidst their growing confidence will require the U.S.
to moderate beyond rhetoric. The U.S. should be prepared to make a series of calculated
concessions to alleviate tensions without losing real or conceptual “key terrain”.
However, if the U.S. becomes inert in strategic research or policy planning, it will likely
be at a disadvantage. This situation will allow the Chinese to take broader liberties regionally
despite our staying conventional superiority. The Chinese will be more likely to wield their
power, especially if this is pursuant to a goal the Chinese see directly aligned with their manifest
identity. A weakened deterrent or the lack of a firm but conciliatory strategy will create a
tenuous environment. War or proxy war between the U.S. and China will then be likely.
The downside to a conflict at this time is that our potentially swift victory from superior
conventional and allied forces will likely humiliate China. China is a face-based culture still
writhing from the humiliation at the hands of the West during the 19th and early 20th century.
Humiliating a powerful state, particularly so close to its territory typically strengthens the
chances for future conflict. When Germany was humiliated at the end of WWI, this led to a
nationalist rise and a German war state that was much more menacing than ever before. If the
second largest and soon to be largest economy in the world mobilizes for war, future U.S.
strategic advantages could greatly diminish.

169. Caitlin Talmadge, “The U.S.-China Nuclear Relationship,” 6.
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Economic Implications. The Chinese economy will be comparable to that of the U.S.
China will invest comparably into area denial and projection forces. This will strengthen the
survivability and deterrence of their strategic systems, while weakening the desired effect of U.S.
systems. With a more secure force, China will likely no longer shy away from increasing defense
spending to match the 4% of GDP the United States spends. This will not bode well for the U.S.
in the following period, as it will face the largest global economy.
Diplomatic Implications. The U.S. will need to establish hard policy lines over which
they cannot allow the Chinese to transgress – lest it alter regional power dynamics to an
unacceptable degree. However, it must also provide China some status recognition and make
concessions where possible. The U.S. should also seek partnerships with the Chinese to help
alter their perception of the U.S. and increase jointly dependent interests. Interdependence could
act to deter conflict as the Chinese transition to the most powerful or at least most militarily
present nation in the region. These efforts would also help maintain our regional presence and
assure our allies that we remain the regional counterweight to China. Publicly declaring our
uncompromising areas of policy while increasing force posture as it relates to China will
demonstrate resolve. Simultaneously diminishing our presence and influence in certain regional
political matters will depict our actions as reasonable. If China sees U.S. calculated risks and
similarly aligned forces, it could prevent them from forcing a scenario where they gamble that
the Chinese threshold for conflict within their own region is lower than that of the U.S.
Moreover, with the U.S. granting certain public concessions to satiate their strategic appetite,
China may not feel compelled to seriously conflict with the U.S.
The U.S. must demonstrate a willingness to accept risk, lest they accept inaction and its
fallacies mentioned above. However, zealotry and recklessness in this endeavor could lead to
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war or a Chinese war-state. Therefore, candid diplomatic action backed by force will grant the
U.S. and its allies their best chance to uphold their interests.170 Making an immediate potential
concession such as accepting a Chinese South China Sea claim, or halting military sales to
Taiwan will act as a show of good faith consistent with the Chinese cultural past of kowtowing
and the like. This acknowledgement will suggest that the U.S. recognizes, to some extent, the
Chinese as a legitimate regional power. Status recognition will empower the politically moderate
within China, further diffusing tensions. However, due to the strategic value of the Senkaku
islands and of America’s Japanese ally in general, the United States needs to take a hard stance
on maintaining a forward presence in the ECS. Tension here would be mitigated through some of
the aforementioned concessions that the U.S. are in a unique position to provide. “Improving
mutual understanding among potential nuclear adversaries is an important part of deterrence.
Such is the purpose of … bilateral strategic dialogues.”171 The more frequently the U.S. enters
dialogue with China as equals, the more each side will learn the other’s peculiarities of conflict
resolution.
Research and Engineering. The U.S. will be fielding advanced enabling capabilities in the
space and cyber domain, as well as advanced delivery mechanisms for nuclear weapons and
strategic ordinance. These advancements maintain U.S. pre-eminence strategically and offer us
some operational advantages. Although, any major advantage will likely be quickly parroted and
thus short-lived. There will begin to be a role reversal in military investment strategies between
the U.S. and China. The anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) tactics that are so effective for
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China against the U.S. will work against China with respect to Japan.172 The Senkakus are well
armed with detection mechanisms and Japanese A2/AD and anti-submarine assets. When these
capabilities are bolstered by the United States’ naval and aerial pre-eminence, China cannot
defeat the joint force.173 Investments into the advanced A2/AD capabilities of Vietnam, the
Philippines, Taiwan, etc. will further check Chinese military power projection. The ultimate
efficacy of these A2/AD programs rests with eventual U.S. intervention. If America’s allies lose
faith the U.S. will support them, their resolve to resist an overwhelming conventionally armed
China may dwindle fast. American research and engineering must invest in technologies to assist
their allies’ defensive strategies, nested within a broader U.S. capability.
Adversary Actions and Strategic Culture Assessment. China will be actively coercing the
international community for greater control in international institutions and great significance for
the institutions and initiatives it created. “The PLA is devoting considerable effort to developing
power projection capabilities, doctrine, and political justifications that would support
expeditionary operations well beyond China’s land borders”.174 China’s future force posture will
unapologetically support global expeditions and interests. Unapologetically so, because China is
a nation of exceptional heritage and earthly position. Moreover, any strong nation would do the
same. However, Chinese animosity toward the U.S. will diminish with status recognition, i.e.
meaningful U.S. backed concessions in various disputes. Concessions on disputes central to the
identity of China will likely allow the U.S. some operational leeway on issues that are more
peripheral. Should the U.S. be able to quietly provoke an over-reaction on a lesser issue, such as
Australian or African investment, it would injure the desired image of the altruistic and
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benevolent CCP. These peripheral tactics would be the most effective at undermining the
domestic and international efficacy of the CCP. Eventually, along with the other policies
mentioned above, this could undermine China’s overarching strategy.
Period 3. The Peer Threat. The final period assessed here is the period of parity. This
paper estimates the period to occur from 2035 to approximately 2040. Speculating much beyond
this period involves too many variables for the scope of this analysis. Perhaps the Chinese will
become the clearly superior force. Perhaps they will succumb to internal pressures. Maybe a new
power will rise and change the dynamic entirely. Or, perhaps the period of relative power parity
will persist for a few decades.
Characteristics. The Chinese force conventionally and strategically will compare evenly
to that of the U.S. and overtake the U.S. in number. Chinese power projection will begin to
decisively span outside of the region and will take considerable effort to contain. Cyber conflict
will be a routine element of “peacetime” military operations. A somewhat militarized space
domain will see its first clashes for pre-eminence, and require a more comprehensive strategy for
the U.S. to maintain its freedom of operation. U.S. forces will need to adjust strategic force
deployments and redeployments continuously to compete with a now globally proficient
strategic adversary. This will harken to the ebbing and flowing of European and Caribbean
missile system deployments during the Cold War. U.S. nuclear force investments will lose much
of the proactive opportunistic edge and will be equally reactive to Chinese strategic forces. The
U.S. will develop new strategy to counter developing Chinese force posture similar to the
reassessment of early Cold War nuclear strategy under Presidents Nixon and Carter. While arms
control will occur, global dynamics will make its greatest utility a stabilizing bi-lateral dialogue
instead of tangible gains.

88

However, if U.S. economic growth has not sustained, this period will usher in the
decisive security advantage of China. If the U.S. failed to undergo rigorous strategic analysis,
this period will likely see expansionist Chinese policies with possible conflict and proxy
conflicts similar to the Cold War. The U.S. will then hope to keep conflict primarily within
China’s regional sphere of influence.
Economic Implications. The Chinese economy markedly overcomes the middle-income
gap, and overtakes the U.S. in size and productivity. However, their lack of immigration and
aging domestic demographics causes growth to slow to levels comparable to that of the U.S. and
other developed nations. China invests further into regional initiatives such as BRI to attempt to
externally shock its system out of the impending geriatric effects. Due to a steady stream of
immigration and resource wealth, the U.S. economy remains productive but continues to struggle
with debt. The somewhat volatile future of these two economic giants adds tension to the
strategic competition. China will have to maintain economic growth as its newly assumed
regional and global security role will require significant and persistent force investments on an
unprecedented scale.
Diplomatic Implications. The U.S.’s role in Asia will be primarily to contain Chinese
influence regionally. We will lose the support of some of our allies closest to the Chinese
juggernaut. Coalitions led by the U.S. and China, respectively, will dominate international
relations. Soft lines of strategic import will be tested and transgressed. Hard lines will require
reinforcement by showings of force or even small skirmishes. This period requires a new
strategic assessment to analyze what the U.S. is willing to go to war over. The Chinese military
coalition will grow and their force projection capabilities will drift into areas of traditional U.S.
pre-eminence. Arms control will be a prominent characteristic of this period – especially as
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China seeks international legitimacy. Refusing to negotiate will no longer be tenable for one of
the primary centers of geopolitics. As mentioned above, the likely multi-polar dynamics of this
environment would make it unwise to invest overly in the success or fruition of arms control.
Arms control will add stability through the forum it creates. Moreover, the hyperrealist dynamics
of Chinese SC, along with the lack of legality as a legitimating factor for governance, will lead
China to agree to arms control measures without the intention of following many of the terms.
The threshold for coercive force will lower. The most powerful regional actor was the
U.S., who passively enforced its foreign will from afar. This period will see the most powerful
regional actor as a state whose immediate economic and security zone are amidst policy
disagreements. However, the U.S. will retain its regional counterbalance role. Nations will still
seek its protective shield to balance Chinese interests. Although, those nations will have to deal
with China regardless of political discrepancies. China’s local power and economic reach will be
too great to ignore entirely for the pursuit of U.S. patronage.
First, U.S. policymakers should acknowledge… the trade-offs inherent in a more
competitive nuclear relationship with China. U.S. refusal to acknowledge mutual
vulnerability, when combined with continued development of capabilities relevant
to damage limitation… makes China relatively more likely to adopt an ambitious
nuclear strategy than would otherwise be the case. It could create rational
incentives for China to…move away from NFU, for example.175
Greater competition begets greater trade-offs. The risks in refusing to accept a somewhat
transitioning geopolitical game could have nuclear implications. Such reckless strategy could
also lead to conventional conflict occurring in the atmosphere of nuclear parity. The goal is to
guide China into a passive nuclear strategy and less contentious regional role in general.
Research and Engineering Implications. Expenditure roles will switch from previous U.S.
Chinese dynamics. The U.S. will have to invest in strategic deterrent forces that are cost effective
175. Caitlin Talmadge, “The U.S.-China Nuclear Relationship,” 8.
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and deter the larger Chinese force (barring a game changing defensive technology). Low-level
conflict in space will lead to an unprecedented militarized space race. Perpetual cyber domain
conflict will necessitate persistent investment in and development of information assurance
mechanisms. Nuclear weapon system development will be largely reactive for both nations. For
the first time, China will not be able to modernize based largely or partially on more advanced
adversaries and existing technology. China will need to innovate its own systems. Additionally,
Chinese conventional force investments, to go along with its increased political role, will require
a relative lessening of strategic expenditures vis a vis conventional forces.
Adversary Actions and Strategic Culture Assessment. China will no longer seek
appeasement of the United States. As discussed, it will halfheartedly enter into arms control.
China will likely only seek policy moderation if it is through an international governing body
that could affect the perception of legitimate Chinese leadership. Chinese face-based society and
hyperrealism will not allow for the benevolent cooperative force its soft power suggests. At best,
the Chinese will govern as the benevolent dictator of the Ancient Chinese past. Overtaking the
U.S. in number of forces is critically important, as the middle kingdom must assume its rightful
role. U.S. attempts to attack CCP legitimacy and covert operations against the Chinese
government should increase. However, the strategy behind such actions will be more important
than ever as China’s leadership will likely require metaphorical kowtowing. Any refusal to
“genuflect” let alone subversive actions, if discovered, could lead to conflict.
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Periodic Conclusions
The particulars of the time-bound strategic framework above are less critical than the
overarching approach. In a few pages, the dialogue assessed real potential force posture
dynamics and all of the implications therein. The speculative exercise tailored U.S. responses to
projected Chinese activity and culture. A more in depth analysis, with better, classified sources
of information regarding the Chinese state could prove even more useful in modeling the
strategic environment for U.S. decision makers. However, without properly understanding the
security dynamic over time between the U.S. and China, it is difficult to discern whether planned
force modifications are adequate. Without understanding if a familiar template for strategizing
will resonate with a current situation, analysis may lack proper direction. Finally, prior to
implementation, any analysis requires input regarding tailored strategies to help predict
competitor reactions and establish the most effective methods of communication with that
competitor. This paper sought to provide understanding, direction, and applicability in just this
way to better color the periodic assessment.
Our model described a phase of U.S. strategic superiority, a period of transition and near
peer threat, and a period of total parity with an upward trend of Chinese growth. Ultimately, the
United States should use a similar framework to provide guidance to their impetus for rapid
nuclear revitalization, prototyping, and system fielding. China is advancing. Their interests often
counter those of the United States. The bi-lateral dynamic allows for an uncommon period of
opportunity to prepare not only force modernization, but policy stimulation and follow-on force
modification. Well-formulated policy will be key to ensuring that the U.S. adequately and deftly
use strategic assets to deter an unacceptable lack of security regionally and globally.

92

This concept is not particularly novel. The Chinese used just this type of long-term,
phased analysis to grow to their current economic and military strength. China’s leaders
characterize the first two decades of this century as the “period of strategic opportunity” whereby
China expanded its “comprehensive national power.” Pursuant of their 2049 Centenary Goal,
China is now focused on “realizing a powerful and prosperous China” consisting of a “worldclass” military. The improved Chinese military will secure China’s great power status with the
specific objective of China becoming “the preeminent power” in the Indo-Pacific region.176 The
U.S. must now set the agenda for the next 20 years to be that of U.S. advancement. China serves
as proof that tailored, specific, and time-bound strategy has a high probability of providing much
momentum to national objectives. The policy imperative for the United States is to take the
opportunity to develop a comprehensive strategy to deter and defeat the Chinese Strategic threat.
Furthermore, the future of U.S. – China relations need not be so volatile. Perhaps there is
room for great power competition, mutual understanding, and stability. If the U.S. better
manages and prepares for competition with China, they may avoid actual conflict with the
Chinese. Total appeasement could reduce U.S. interests to an unacceptable threshold requiring
our allies or future leaders to attempt to reset relations with warfare. Without an institutional
check, China may decide conflict is in fact in its best interest. If the U.S. attempts to combat and
counter every policy decision and development of the Chinese state, then bold rhetoric and
strategic tensions will likely lead to a Sino-American conflict. Currently the world rests firmly
within the unfortunate but steady march toward the second scenario.
However, a United States ready to serve as a reasonable, informed, and prepared counterweight to China in East Asia could allow for a stable environment of concessions and deterrence.
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Informed decision-making processes on each side will help the nations navigate policy concerns
without resorting to arms for resolution. Tensions will persist between the U.S. and China. Their
interests will not align. However, perhaps a slightly contentious status quo could become the way
of the future. As we prepare to enter what this paper frequently seems to suggest could be a new
Cold War, it is important to note some differences between China and the Soviet Union. The
Chinese are a much more economically integrated power to the West and the liberal international
order than the Soviets were. They do not maintain a stranglehold on power in their region, as did
the U.S.’s former adversary. Lastly, their significant impending demographic issues provide
more immediate impediments to Chinese long-term growth than faced the early Soviet Union.177
China and the U.S. have the opportunity for normalized relations amidst the tensions. Yet,
without proper U.S. strategic preparation, America will soon not have a firm foundation from
which to negotiate as equals. This platform is critical to maintaining stability between the U.S.
and China whether it be amid U.S. power projection or Chinese designs on political expansion.
“Effective global governance in the twenty-first century will inevitably be determined by
the interests and willingness of great powers to share their responsibilities for providing public
good and addressing challenges in the international system.”178 Perhaps global governance is not
so much united bodies democratically driving uniform policy. Maybe global governance is a
balancing of interests between great powers. These powers will need to share in the pursuits of
their interest and the advancement of society. To this author, successful governance will be if the
United States can maintain an effective strategic deterrent against China in order to prevent the
tumultuous remaking of the international system and the contentious divesting of power or rights
from current actors.
177. Barry Naughton, “Is China Socialist?,” 3-24.
178. Feng, Liu, “China-India Engagement in Institutions,” 231-232.
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Kenneth Waltz views the international order as essentially existing in a near constant
cycle of war preparation. For this reason, war preparation is reasonable. Making concessions
outside of one’s ideal political interests is not only unlikely, it is largely unnecessary in the
scheme of geopolitical trajectory.179 I am oversimplifying, but if we took Waltz’s advice, the U.S
could continue large-scale tech investments and conflict pursuing rhetoric. To divert would only
forestall the inevitable. Thucydides believed that hubris was not worth war. He suggested that the
fear of the future could be put to good use if we do not succumb to its menacing control. He
appealed to a higher rationality. His recommendation was to make all reasonable concessions
and appeasements in order to avoid war: because one never can know the course of such conflict,
or its consequences.180 U.S. strategy must meld Waltz’s call to prepare for war with Thucydides’
desire to avoid conflict. Ultimately, the United States must make some concessions to avoid war.
Yet unlike Thucydides, this cannot come at any cost. We must have a realistic understanding and
acceptance of China and Chinese power to clearly define a productive balance. Stabilizing the
U.S. – Chinese relationship in this way currently requires revitalizing the U.S.’s history of
sophisticated strategy.

179. Kenneth Neal Waltz, Man, the State and War: a Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press,
2018).
180. Thucydides and Charles Forster Smith, Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1996).
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